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Made by Corporate Employee To Secure Legal
Advice and a Matter Committed to a Professional
Legal Advisor Is Prima Facie Committed To
Secure Legal Advice
I. FACTS A HOLDING
The Board of Directors of petitioner corporation,' after learning
that the corporation may have maintained a "slush fund" to bribe
purchasing agents of other businesses, 2 hired a law firm to investi-
gate the business practices of the corporation and possibly make
recommendations as to future conduct.' In subsequent litigation in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Mis-
souri, respondent corporation,5 claiming that it had been harmed by
the petitioner's bribery, sought to discover a written report from the
law firm containing the firm's findings and recommendations.' After
1. Petitioner engaged primarily in manufacturing and processing nonferrous metals; its
operations included interstate sales of scrap copper.
2. The possible existence of a "slush fund" came to light during two lawsuits in 1974
and 1975 arising from a proxy fight. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) subse-
quently conducted an official investigation of petitioner and filed suit against it for an injunc.
tion. In response to an agency subpoena during the investigation petitioner surrendered to
the SEC without protest the material sought by respondent corporation.
3. The law firm, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering of Washington, D.C., was not petitioner's
regular counsel. Petitioner chose this firm because of its expertise in SEC practice. Petitioner
employed the law firm in the spring of 1975, before the SEC had taken any official action.
An accounting firm, Arthur Andersen & Co., aided the law firm in its investigation,
which included interviews with corporate employees and an examination of petitioner's busi-
ness records.
4. A resolution by petitioner's Board of Directors authorized the engagement of the law
firm "to conduct an investigation and inquiry into the matters disclosed and discussed in this
regard at this meeting for the purposes of eliciting facts, making certain findings, and provid-
ing to the Board of Directors of this Corporation a report possibly containing recommenda-
tions as to course of action. . . ."Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 606, 607 (8th
Cir. 1978). The resolution also directed all directors, officers, and employees to cooperate with
.the investigation.
5. The Weatherhead Company filed a complaint on July 9, 1976, alleging that peti-
tioner and Weatherhead employees had conspired to sell Weatherhead an inferior grade of
copper, in return for which Weatherhead employees received bribes from petitioner's "slush
fund." Weatherhead also alleged tortious interference with its employment contracts and
violation of § 4 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). See Weatherhead Co. v.
Diversified Indus., Inc., No. 76-623C(1) (E.D. Mo., filed July 9, 1976).
6. Judge Heaney's en bane majority opinion described the report, dated December 1975
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viewing the report in camera, the district court ordered disclosure.7
Petitioner thereupon petitioned the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
for a writ of mandamus,8 arguing that the attorney-client privilege'
protected the report. A three-judge panel denied the petition,10 find-
ing that the privilege did not attach" because petitioner had not
hired the law firm to provide legal services or advice. 12 On reconsi-
as follows: "[It] summarized [the] interviews, analyzed the accounting data, evaluated the
conduct of certain employees, drew conclusions as to the propriety of their conduct and made
recommendations as to steps Diversified should take." 572 F.2d at 608. Judge Henley's
opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, added the following information: the law
firm determined whether funds "had in fact been surreptitiously created and used in violation
of Diversified's established business procedures and internal controls;" the law firm stressed
a warning by Arthur Andersen & Co. that the recommended accounting procedures would
be useless if ignored by those responsible for implementing them; and the law firm recom-
mended that the Board (1) adopt the accounting procedures proposed by Arthur Andersen &
Co., (2) make personnel changes necessary to prevent recurrence of certain practices, and (3)
consider whether to restore allegedly misused funds. 572 F.2d at 615.
Respondent also sought discovery of the following documents: (1) a memorandum from
the law firm dated June 19, 1975, outlining how it proposed to conduct the investigation and
discussing the extent to which information developed by the investigation would be immune
from disclosure; (2) corporate minutes covering meetings held by petitioner's Board of Direc-
tors from early May 1975 to July 1976; and (3) a memorandum dated January 30, 1976, from
the president of petitioner corporation to corporate officers and heads of company divisions
and subsidiaries, revealing to some extent the results of the investigation.
7. The district court had overruled without opinion petitioner's objection to discovery
and had refused reconsideration and certification for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b) (1970).
8. The writ was directed at Respondent James H. Meredith, Chief Judge of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.
9. See note 13 infra and accompanying text. Petitioner also claimed that the "work
product" doctrine of FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) protected the documents.
10. The court noted that while mandamus is not ordinarily available to review interlo-
cutory discovery orders, it is available when a claim of attorney-client privilege has been
raised and rejected. 572 F.2d at 599. The court therefore considered the petition on its merits.
11. The court rejected the "work product" argument because it found that the law firm
had not prepared the report because of any prospect of litigation, a prerequisite of the "work
product" doctrine. See note 13 infra. The court also concluded that the attorney-client privi-
lege did not protect the June 1975 memorandum because it contained no confidential infor-
mation, and that the corporate minutes were unprotected because they were not privileged
in themselves and the documents they revealed-the memorandum and report-were not
privileged. 572 F.2d at 603-04. Because it found the documents were not privileged, the court
did not reach Weatherhead's argument that petitioner had waived its privilege by voluntarily
submitting the material to the SEC. See note 2 supra.
12. For the privilege to attach, a lawyer must be employed to render legal services or
advice. See notes 34-61 infra and accompanying text. The court stated that the law firm was
hired "solely for the purpose of making an investigation of facts and to make business recom-
mendations" and that the work could have been performed "just as readily by non-lawyers."
Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d at 603.
Judge Heaney, concurring and dissenting, disagreed with the majority's characterization.
He described the report as ' detailing specific conduct considered. . . to be violative of the
law" and containing recommendations on how to "avoid future violations of the law." 572
F.2d at 605.
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deration by the Court of Appeals en banc, held, petition granted.
The attorney-client privilege protects communications made by a
corporate employee to the corporation's lawyer at the direction of
the employee's superior if the communication concerns the em-
ployee's duties, is not disseminated beyond those persons in the
corporation who need to know its contents, and is made to secure
legal advice; furthermore, absent a clear showing to the contrary, a
matter committed to a professional legal advisor is prima facie com-
mitted to secure legal advice. Diversified Industries, Inc. v.
Meredith, 572 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1978).
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
When the requirements of the attorney-client privilege are
met, 3 the privilege is an absolute barrier against disclosure of com-
munications from client to lawyer."4 The privilege derives from the
13. The court in United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass.
1950), enumerated the conditions that must exist for the attorney-client privilege to apply:
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person
to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his
subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3)
the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client
(b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i)
an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and
not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a)
claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
Id. at 358-59. See generally C. McCoRMIcK, McCoRMlcK ON EvmNcE §§ 87-97 (2d ed. 1972);
J. WroMons, 8 WMoPE ON EvIDENCE §§ 2290-2329 (rev. ed. J. McNaughton 1961); C. WmxoHT
& A. MnLLER, 8 FEDERan PRAMvC AND PROCEDURE § 2017 (1970). For a history of the privilege,
see WIGMORE § 2290; Gardner, A Re-Evaluation of the Attorney-Client Privilege (pt. 1), 8
VML. L. Rsv. 279 (1963); Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between
Lawyer and Client, 16 CALiF. L. REv. 487 (1928).
The proposed Federal Rules of Evidence contained thirteen rules dealing with privileges,
including one, Rule 503, that covered the attorney-client privilege. Congress, however, en-
acted only one general rule, providing that "privilege[s] . . . shall be governed by the
principles of the common law .... " FED. R. Evm. 501; J. WE sr m & M. BERGER, 2
WEINSTEm'S EVIDENCE I 501[01, 503 (1977) [hereinafter cited as WamsTm]. Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides in part: "Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action
.... " (emphasis added).
The related "work product" doctrine protects against disclosure of information or materi-
als "prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or his representa-
tive," unless the party seeking discovery shows "substantial need" and "undue hardship."
See generally WiOhr & MILI.R, supra, at §§ 2021-2028.
14. A showing of good cause cannot defeat the attorney-client privilege, as it can the
"work product" rule. See note 13 supra. But see Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1103-
04 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
If the opposing party claims the privilege, however, the discovering party nonetheless
may question opposing counsel as to the capacity in which he was employed. Colton v. United
States, 306 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963).
1978]
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rationale that first, protection of such communications promotes
freedom of consultation with and ffiller disclosure to legal counsel,
and second, that the benefits to justice and to society from consulta-
tion and fuller disclosure outweigh the obstacles to trial preparation
for the party seeking discovery."5 Because the second part of the
rationale cannot be objectively verified, however, commentators
long have argued that courts should strictly confine the privilege
within the narrowest limits consistent with its logic."8 In addition,
commentators recently have questioned whether the privilege does
encourage legal consultation. 17 Thus, much justification exists for
restricting the privilege in areas of uncertainty.
Defining the proper scope of the attorney-client privilege is dif-
ficult when the client is a corporation, 8 for such cases present sev-
eral problems that either do not exist or are greatly simplified when
the client is a natural person. 9 An initial problem courts must re-
solve is determining which corporate employees can be said to speak
for the corporation for purposes of the attorney-client privilege. If
the communications of every employee could qualify for the privi-
lege, too much information would be immune from discovery."0 Fed-
eral courts have developed two principal tests to answer this ques-
15. WirMoRE, supra note 13, at § 2291; Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporate
Clients: The Control Group Test, 84 HiARv. L. REv. 424, 425 (1970).
16. WiMoRE, supra note 13, at § 2291; WEINSTEIN, supra note 13, at 503[02].
17. Note, supra note 15, at 425 n.7, 428; Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed
Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HARv. L. REv. 464, 469-77 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Fixed Rules] (arguing that clients continue to consult lawyers
because there is no substitute for legal advice and because the need for advice often outweighs
the consequences of disclosure to an opposing party); Note, Functional Overlap Between the
Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged Communications
Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1262 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Note, Functional Overlap]
(empirical study showing that of 98 laymen questioned, 53 said either they did not believe
there was an attorney-client privilege or they did not know; also, that of 108 laymen ques-
tioned, 53 said either they would make full disclosure to counsel even if no privilege existed
or they did not know).
That the attorney-client privilege, unlike the "work product" rule, is absolute and cannot
be set aside for good cause also supports the policy of strict construction. See Note, supra
note 15, at 425-26; see note 13 supra.
18. WEINSTEIN, supra note 13, at I 503(b)[04]. Many commentators have discussed the
application of the attorney-client privilege to corporate clients. An early and still important
article is Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YmLE L.J. 953
(1956). A number of articles provide guidance for practitioners in the area. E.g., Withrow,
How to Preserve the Privilege, 15 PRnc. LAw. 30 (Nov. 1969). A helpful bibliography appears
at WEINSTEIN, supra note 13, at 503-8 to -10.
19. WEINSTEIN, supra note 13, at I 503(b)[041. For a treatment of attorney-corporate
client problems in addition to those discussed below, see id.
20. "[W]here corporations are involved, with their large number of agents, masses of
documents, and frequent dealings with lawyers, the zone of silence grows large." Simon, supra
note 18, at 955.
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tion.21 City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.22 formu-
lated the "control group" test, which states that a communicating
employee may be said to speak for the corporation if he is in a
position to control or take a substantial part in a decision about any
action that the corporation may take upon the advice of the attor-
ney.Y By restricting the privilege to communications by corporate
decisionmakers, the Westinghouse court attempted to avoid conflict
with Hickman v. Taylor,U a Supreme Court decision raising the
possibility that the attorney-client privilege would not attach when
lower-ranking employees merely relay information to a lawyer.23
Though several courts have adopted the "control group" test, 18 com-
mentators have criticized it for restricting the privilege too nar-
rowlyY In Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker,28 the Seventh
21. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 606, 608 (8th Cir. 1978); cf.
WEINSTEIN, supra note 13, at I 503(b)[04] (suggesting a third test set forth in United States
v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950), that would protect communica-
tions by any officer or employee of a corporation).
22. 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.), mandamus and prohibition denied sub. nom. General
Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963).
23. Id. at 485.
24. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
25. See 210 F. Supp. at 485; Weinschel, Corporate Employee Interviews and the
Attorney-Client Privilege, 12 B.C. IN. & COM. L. Rav. 873, 877 (1971). The Hickman Court
denied the privilege to witnesses who were employees of defendant partnership. Though the
Court did not discuss the significance of this fact, later courts feared that the privilege would
not protect information conveyed to attorneys by lower-level employees.
26. See, e.g., Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686,692 (10th Cir. 1968); Virginia Elec. & Power
Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397, 400 (E.D. Va. 1975); United States
v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 66 F.R.D. 154, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Burlington Indus. v.
Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 35 (D. Md. 1974); Congoleum Indus. v. GAF Corp., 49 F.R.D.
82, 85 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
27. See WMNSTmm, supra note 13, at 503(b)[04]; Kobak, Uneven Application of the
Attorney-Client Privilege to Corporations in the Federal Courts, 6 GA. L. REy. 339,368 (1972);
Weinschel, supra note 25, at 875-76; Note, Privileged Communications-Inroads on the
"Control Group" Test in the Corporate Area, 22 SYRAc SE L. Rav. 759, 761-62 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Inroads]. Under the "control group" test, corporate counsel faces
a dilemma: if he gathers information from employees outside the "control group" in an effort
to advise his client, he may be developing evidence that an opposing party can discover and
use against the corporation; if, however, he restricts his interviews to those employees who
are certainly within the "control group," he may find it difficult to gather all the necessary
information. Weinschel, supra note 25, at 875-76. This result conflicts with the rationale
behind the privilege-encouraging corporations that need legal advice to make full disclosure
to their counsel. Id. Furthermore, while the "control group" test assures that corporate
employees who qualify to speak for the corporation are both "information givers" and
"decision makers," as are natural clients, Note, Evidence-Privileged Communica-
tions-The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting. A Suggested Approach, 69
MICH. L. Rav. 360, 374 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Note, Evidence], writers have argued that
this attempt to equate corporate and individual clients is unrealistic. Burnham,
Confidentiality and the Corporate Lawyer: The Attorney-Client Privilege and "Work Prod-
uct" in Illinois, 56 ILL. B.J. 542, 544-48 (1968).
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Circuit set forth a second test under which an employee speaks for
the corporation if the employee makes a communication to the cor-
poration's attorney at the direction of a superior, and if the subject-
matter of the communication concerns the performance of the em-
ployee's duties. 9 Commentators have commended the Harper test
for expanding the scope of the privilege,"0 but several writers have
suggested that the test would be less susceptible to abuse if it re-
quired that the communication be made to secure legal advice.31
The Supreme Court's four-four affirmance of Harper in 19702 did
little to resolve the conflict in the courts over the two tests.33
A second issue a court must resolve when considering a claim
of attorney-corporate client privilege is whether the lawyer acted in
One writer has vigorously defended the "control group" test, arguing that it provides "an
easily applicable bright-line rule to facilitate judicial decisionmaking." Note, supra note 15,
at 430; cf. 20 U.C.L.A. L. Rnv. 288, 300 (1972) ("control group" test is easily applied, but
ease of application may not be primary goal in attorney-client privilege). Similarly, other
commentators have asserted that certainty of application is essential to the functioning of
the privilege. E.g., WENSTM, supra note 13, at % 503[02]. One writer, however, has recently
attacked this position, reasoning that in many situations clients will seek legal advice even
when the availability of the attorney-client privilege is uncertain. Note, Fixed Rules, supra
note 17, at 472.
28. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 400 U.S.
348 (1971).
29. Id. at 491-92.
30. See Weinschel, supra note 25, at 877; Note, Inroads, supra note 27, at 765-66; 23
VAND. L. REv. 847, 852-53 (1970); cf. Kobak, supra note 27, at 368 ("control group" test
criticized because it does not encourage all corporate employees to seek legal advice).
Few courts have adopted the Harper test. The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege in the
Federal Courts, 22 CATH. LAW. 138, 150 (1976). But see Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken,
Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1165 (D.S.C. 1974); Hasso v. Retail Credit Co., 58 F.R.D. 425, 428
(E.D. Pa. 1973). Cf. Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp. v. Imoco-Gateway Corp., 62 F.R.D. 454 (N.D.
I1. 1974) (mem.), aff'd without opinion, 534 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1976)(finding that the
attorney-client privilege attaches to a communication between counsel and corporate employ-
ees that was disseminated to other corporate employees directly concerned with the informa-
tion communicated).
31. W aNSTEN, supra note 13, at I 503(b)[04]; Note, Inroads, supra note 27, at 769.
Cf. Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1165 (D.S.C. 1974) ("control
group" test is insufficient; communication must be incident to request for legal advice);
Kobak, supra note 27, at 369 (central issue in attorney-client privilege is whether employee
honestly sought legal advice).
Writers making this suggestion apparently have assumed that courts were not strictly
enforcing a separate element of the privilege-that in connection with the communication
legal advice be requested or rendered. See note 34 infra and accompanying text. Adding a
restriction to the Harper test is therefore seen as a way to tighten judicial analysis of the issue
of who may speak for the corporation. Cf. 23 VAND. L. REV. 847, 852 (1970) (noting that state
courts have resolved the problem of who may speak for the corporation by strictly construing
the other elements of the privilege-for example, that the communication be made to secure
legal advice).
32. See note 28 supra.
33. Weinschel, supra note 25, at 877.
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a legal capacity, a prerequisite for applying the privilege. 4 Although
this problem exists when the client is a natural person,35 it is aggra-
vated in the corporate area because patent, house, and outside cor-
porate counsel give much business advice as well as legal advice.36
Because determination of the legal or nonlegal nature of advice
requires an examination of individual facts and circumstances, 7
generalizations cannot easily be drawn from opinions considering
this question."5 Nevertheless, some principles do emerge from the
cases.
First, courts determine whether legal advice was sought or
given by analyzing the particular service rendered for the client, not
by analyzing the overall relationship between the lawyer and client.
The court in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.39 set
forth and applied the "relationship" approach to communications
34. See note 13 supra. This issue can be analyzed by examining either the client's
request or the attorney's product. Cf. United States v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 66
F.R.D. 206, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("One of the essential elements of the attorney-client privi-
lege is that the attorney be acting as attorney, that the communication be made for the
purpose of securing legal services."). It generally does not matter which viewpoint is adopted,
because in most situations the attorney will provide what the client requested. When, how-
ever, the request and the product differ, the request should control determination of the issue.
This is because the rationale for the attorney-client privilege is that it encourages clients to
seek legal advice; if the client did not request legal advice the privilege should not attach.
See notes 13-17 supra and accompanying text.
No single article has dealt with this element of the attorney-client privilege in a compre-
hensive fashion. For background treatment of selected topics, see WFNSTEIN, supra note 13,
at 503(a)(1)[01]; Heininger, The Attorney-Client Privilege As It Relates to Corporations,
53 ILL. B.J. 376, 378-84 (1965); Kobak, supra note 27, at 354-62; Petersen, Attorney-Client
Privilege in Internal Revenue Investigations, 54 MINN. L. REv. 67 (1969); Simon, supra note
18, at 969-78; Note, Functional Overlap, supra note 17; Note, Nature of the Professional
Relationship Required Under Pivileged Communication Rule, 24 IowA L. REV. 538 (1939);
39 Foniw L. Rav. 281, 287-90 (1970); 4 S.ToN HALm L. Rav. 531 (1973).
The burden of establishing the attorney-client relationship is on the party claiming the
privilege. WEINsTmIN, supra note 13, at 503(a)(1)[01].
35. Note, Evidence, supra note 27, at 376.
36. "Whether they be 'outside' counsel or 'house' counsel, they can rarely confine them-
selves to purely legal matters. Questions of policy, as well as executive guidance for matters
that are partly legal, often fall within their domain." Simon, supra note 18, at 969. See United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950); WEISTEIN, supra note
13, at 503(a)(2)[01]; Gardner, A Personal Privilege for Communications of Corporate
Clients-Paradox or Public Policy?, 15 U. DEr. L.J. 299, 354 (1963) ("most of the corporate
law practice today consists largely in the giving of sound business advice").
37. American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85,88 (D. Del. 1962);
see WIGMORE, supra note 13, at § 2296.
38. In fact, courts often produce ad hoc decisions with conflicting results and rationales.
See notes 57-61 infra and accompanying text; Petersen, supra note 34, at 97; 4 SEToN HALL
L. REv. 531, 535 (1973).
39. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950). For a discussion of the "relationship" test see
Simon, supra note 18, at 975-76.
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to and from members of a corporation's patent department." Judge
Wysanski found that members of the department spent their time
principally on questions of business policy and competition," and
thus concluded that an attorney-client relationship did not exist.,,
In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America,43 Judge Leahy
implicitly rejected the "relationship" approach by stating that
members of a patent department qualify for the privilege whenever
they "act as lawyers" in a specific matter,4  which includes applying
rules of law to facts and prosecuting appeals.45 The court in
American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co." expressly
adopted Judge Leahy's approach, observing that by examining each
document separately, a judge could avoid extending or denying un-
justifiably a blanket privilege when counsel performed both legal
and business functions.47 In addition, a number of courts implicitly
have rejected the "relationship" approach by determining the privi-
lege for each document or activity in question. 41
The second principle to be derived from opinions considering
40. United Shoe, defendant in a civil antitrust action, objected to the introduction of
nearly 800 exhibits. Among those documents in issue were (1) documents to and from inde-
pendent lawyers, (2) documents to and from defendant's legal department, and (3) working
papers of persons in the patent department.
Eight members of the patent department did not belong to the bar of any court and 13
did not belong to the Massachusetts bar, facts considered significant by Judge Wysanski. For
a discussion of this problem, see Georgia-Pacific Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood Corp.,
18 F.R.D. 463, 465-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Simon, supra note 18, at 971-73.
41. 89 F. Supp. at 360.
42. rd. at 361.
43. 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954)(defendant in patent infringement action seeking
privilege for some 1600 documents).
44. Id. at 794. See Simon, supra note 18, at 976-77.
45. 121 F. Supp. at 794. The court stated that attorney-employees in a patent depart-
ment do not "act as lawyers" when preparing or prosecuting patent applications because
these acts are not "hallmark" activities of attorneys. Judge Leahy noted that "[a]ny citizen
although not an attorney may qualify for practice before the Patent Office." Id. at 794 n.1.
46. 211 F. Supp. 85 (D. Del. 1962)(documents sought in patent proceeding held not
protected by attorney-client privilege).
47. Id. at 89. See 121 F. Supp. at 793.
48. Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 54 F.R.D. 44 (N.D. Cal. 1971)(eleven page
schedule of documents held to be privileged or nonprivileged); Paper Converting Mach. Co.
v. FMC Corp., 215 F. Supp. 249 (E.D. Wis. 1963)(ruling on each document sought from
defendant's patent counsel); Comercio E. Industria Continental, S.A. v. Dresser Indus., 19
F.R.D. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)(privilege does not apply to transactions when attorney is acting
as a general business agent rather than in his professional capacity); Pye, Fundamentals of
the Attorney-Client Privilege, 15 PRUo. LAw. 15, 20 (Nov. 1969).
Judge Wysanski in United Shoe set forth a test for the attorney-client privilege that
appears to follow the "particularized" approach, stating that the attorney must "in connec-
tion with this communication. . .[be] acting as a lawyer. . . ." 89 F. Supp. at 358. Judge
Wysanski did not follow this language when applying the test to members of the patent
department. See notes 39-42 supra and accompanying text.
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the legal-nonlegal issue is that courts, when confronting either a
request for or rendering of both legal and nonlegal services, have not
required that the services requested or rendered be entirely legal in
order to satisfy the legal capacity requirement of the privilege; in-
stead, the requirement is satisfied if the services are "primarily" or
"predominantly" legal. In suggesting the rationale for this legal test,
the United Shoe court noted that communications from outside
counsel often contain business or public relations advice as well as
legal opinions." Because such nonlegal advice is often in the public
interest, the court reasoned that courts should not order disclosure
merely because nonlegal matters are included in a communication
that also includes legal advice." Although the verbal formulation of
the "predominance" test has varied,51 courts have accepted the test
widely 2 and commentators have approved it as embodying a flexi-
ble and realistic approach to modern corporate law practice. 3 The
decisions remain unclear, however, on the extent to which courts
will separate legal and nonlegal portions of a single document and
extend or deny the privilege to each portion, rather than employ the
"predominantly legal" test to protect the entire document. For ex-
ample, in Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 5 the court noted that al-
though business and legal advice may be "inextricably interwoven"
in one document, courts must "separate out the two" in order to
preserve the integrity of the privilege." In its rulings on individual
documents, however, the Hercules court extended or denied the
privilege to each document as a whole, giving such reasons as
"primarily business advice" or "no request for legal advice.""
49. 89 F. Supp. at 359. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
50. 89 F. Supp. at 359.
51. See Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 54 F.R.D. 44, 46 (N.D. Cal. 1971) ("docu-
ments. . . primarily concerned with giving legal guidance"); Georgia-Pacific Plywood Co.
v. United States Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) ("communications...
largely concerned with opinions on law, legal services or assistance in some legal proceed-
ing"); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D. Del. 1954)
(must give "predominantly" legal advice).
52. In addition to the cases cited at note 51 supra, see Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp.,
434 F. Supp. 136 (D. Del. 1977); North Am. Mortgage Investors v. First Wis. Nat'l Bank, 69
F.R.D. 9 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Chore-Time Equip., Inc. v. Big Dutchman, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 1020
(W.D. Mich. 1966); Pye, supra note 48, at 21. But see Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc.,
397 F. Supp. 1147, 1167 (D.S.C. 1974) ("the attorney-client privilege does not attach where
the patent attorney is giving technical or business, as opposed to legal, advice").
53. 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 281, 289 (1970); see WEINSTEIN, supra note 13, at
503(a)(1)[01.
54. 434 F. Supp. 136 (D. Del. 1977)(patent infringement action in which defendant
sought discovery of 255 documents).
55. Id. at 147.
56. Id. at 148-49. See Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 54 F.R.D. 44, 46-59 (N.D. Cal.
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The last principle derived from decisions addressing the legal-
nonlegal issue is that the "predominance" test is not workable until
courts can agree whether to characterize as legal or nonlegal the
predominant element within a communication or activity.57 Deci-
sions in this area have been inconsistent. For example, some courts
have held that an attorney's preparation of an income tax return is
not a legal activity,8 but others have reached the opposite conclu-
sion, viewing preparation of an income tax return as within an attor-
ney's professional competence. 9 Courts also have given inconsistent
answers to the question whether the preparation and prosecution of
patent applications are legal activities." In addition, courts have
1971). But see United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 193 F. Supp. 251 (N.D.N.Y. 1960).
Earlier in its opinion the Hercules court stated that the request for legal advice need not
always be express. The court wrote: "Client communications intended to keep the attorney
apprised of continuing business developments, with an implied request for legal advice based
thereon, or self-initiated attorney communications intended to keep the client posted on legal
developments and implications may also be protected." 434 F. Supp. at 144; accord, Burling-
ton Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 37 (D. Md. 1974).
57. Most courts have resolved this question without any reference to the "predomi-
nance" test. E.g., Comercio E Industria Continental, S.A. v. Dresser Indus., 19 F.R.D. 265
(S.D.N.Y. 1956). Furthermore, courts have identified a number of nonlegal roles or func-
tions, including accountant, Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1954); business
partner, Lowy v. Commissioner, 262 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1959); agent, United States v.
Bartone, 400 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1027 (1969); manager, United
States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd., 52 F. Supp. 751 (D. Del. 1943); investigator, Metalsalts
Corp. v. Weiss, 76 N.J. Super. 291, 184 A.2d 435 (1962); and negotiator, J.P. Foley & Co. v.
Vanderbilt, 65 F.R.D. 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See generally WEINSTEIN, supra note 13, at I
503(a)(1)[01]; WimoMRE, supra note 13, at § 2296; Simon, supra note 18, at 973-75. Courts
have not been completely successful, however, in applying these labels to difficult fact situa-
tions. See notes 58-60 infra and accompanying text.
One writer has suggested that courts use a balancing approach to resolve the legal-
nonlegal issue and the other requirements of the attorney-client privilege. Note, Fixed Rules,
supra note 17, at 473-79. Courts would weigh the benefits of allowing discovery of the docu-
ments in question against the harm that disclosure would cause. Id. at 478. For a critique of
this approach, see note 92 infra.
58. Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795, 806 (9th Cir. 1954); accord, Canaday v.
United States, 354 F.2d 849, 857 (8th Cir. 1966) (in preparing tax returns attorney had acted
as a "scrivener").
59. Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951
(1963); see United States v. Threlkeld, 241 F. Supp. 324 (W.D. Tenn. 1965). For a discussion
of the attorney-client privilege as applied to attorneys preparing tax returns, see Petersen,
supra note 34, at 91-97.
60. Compare Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792,794 (D.
Del. 1954) (preparing the application of patent letters and prosecuting same in Patent Office
are not "primarily" legal activities) with Ellis-Foster Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.,
159 F. Supp. 917 (D.N.J. 1958) (extending privilege to correspondence between patent attor-
ney and client concerning claims to be made under patent application).
Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963), has complicated the patent area. In that case the
Supreme Court implied that the preparation and prosecution of patent applications are legal
activities. 373 U.S. at 383. Relying on this implication, the United States District Court for
the District of Delaware in 1966 apparently overruled Zenith and held that prosecuting patent
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conflicted sharply over the weight to be given a finding that a non-
lawyer could have performed the activity in question. 1
In summary, courts have not yet resolved how to determine who
may qualify as the corporate client for purposes of the attorney-
client privilege. Furthermore, although courts have developed flexi-
ble and realistic approaches to determine whether legal services
have been sought or rendered, they continue to reach contradictory
results in analyzing difficult fact situations.
III. THE INSTANT OPINION
In seeking to determine which corporate employees can speak
for the corporation for purposes of the attorney-client privilege, the
court adopted the test formulated by the Seventh Circuit in Harper
because, in its opinion, the Harper test was better reasoned than the
"control group" test. The court argued that the Harper test, by
expanding the class of employees who may speak for the corpora-
tion, insured that counsel could develop information necessary to
advise clients on complex legal issues without fear of disclosure."
Noting, however, that under the Harper test a corporation could
abuse the attorney-client privilege by funneling routine documents
through counsel," the majority incorporated several limiting modifi-
cations. In addition to the Harper criteria, the court stated that the
employee must make the communication for the purpose of seeking
legal advice and that the communication must not be disseminated
beyond those corporate personnel who need to know its contents.6'
In determining which of petitioner's employees qualified to
speak for the corporation, the court focused primarily on the first
of these modifications-whether petitioner's employees had made
applications was a privileged activity. Sperti Prods., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 262 F. Supp. 148,
150-51 (D. Del. 1966). But cf. Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F.
Supp. 546 (D.D.C. 1970)(preparing patent applications is not a privileged activity). See
generally 4 SaroN HALL L. Ray. 531 (1973).
61. Compare Ellis.Foster Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 159 F. Supp. 917
(D.N.J. 1958) (fact that nonlawyers could have performed services does not destroy privilege)
with Georgia-Pacific Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463, 464
(S.D.N.Y. 1956) (matters that may "as easily be handled by laymen" are not privileged). See
generally Kobak, supra note 27, at 360; Note, Functional Overlap, supra note 17, at 1234-35.
62. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1978). The court
also criticized the "control group" test for trying to equate the corporate client with an
individual client. Id. at 608.
63. Id. at 609. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
64. 572 F.2d at 609. The modifications, suggested in WmNSTmN, supra note 13, at
503(b)[04], also included the requirement that the employee's superior request the employee




the communications to secure legal advice. To resolve this issue, the
court adopted Dean Wigmore's standard that absent a clear show-
ing to the contrary, a matter committed to a professional legal ad-
visor is prima facie committed to secure legal advice."5 Applying this
standard to the instant case, the court determined that respondent
had made no such showing. To the contrary, the court found the
December report "uniquely legal," reasoning that although accoun-
tants and private investigators could have carried out some of the
investigation alone, "neither would have had the training, skills and
background necessary to make the independent analysis and recom-
mendations. . . ."" Furthermore, the court argued that extending
a privilege to the present facts would encourage corporations to
"seek out and correct wrongdoing in their own house[s] .... ...
Finding that the other requirements of the modified test clearly
were satisfied,"5 the court concluded that the attorney-client privi-
lege protected the December 1975 report.69
Judge Henley in dissent" did not challenge the modified
Harper test adopted by the majority,7' but did take issue with the
Wigmore standard, questioning how, apart from in camera proceed-
ings, a party seeking disclosure could ever overcome the prima facie
65. 572 F.2d at 610. Dean Wigmore sets forth this standard in WMoRE, supra note 13,
at § 2296.
66. 572 F.2d at 610. The court also gave weight to the law firm's "complete autonomy"
in its investigation. Furthermore, in a footnote the court stated that it was not decisive that
the president of petitioner corporation characterized the relationship between petitioner and
the law firm as not being one of attorney-client, and that the nonlegal matter in the report
did not destroy the privilege because such matter was "insubstantial." Id. at 610 n.3.
67. Id. at 610.
68. Id. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
69. 572 F.2d at 611. The court found that the attorney-client privilege protected the
report and relevant portions of the corporate minutes and the January 30 memo because
disclosure of these documents would "directly or inferentially" reveal the contents of the
interviews. Id. at 611; see note 6 supra. The court also concluded that petitioner had given
only a "limited waiver" of the documents by releasing them to the SEC. See notes 2 & 11
supra. The court reasoned that to hold otherwise would thwart investigations by outside
counsel. 572 F.2d at 611.
70. Chief Judge Gibson, writing a separate opinion, agreed with the majority that the
December report was privileged and that the June memo was not. He argued, however, that
the attorney-client privilege should not protect the corporate minutes because stockholders
could inspect them, thereby undermining the required element of confidentiality. 572 F.2d
at 616.
Judge Bright in dissent argued that the case was moot because Weatherhead had ob-
tained the desired information from the SEC files following the SEC investigation of peti-
tioner. He stated, however, that he agreed "in the main" with Judge Henley's dissent. Id. at
617.
71. Id. at 613. Judge Henley did question whether the privilege should protect commu-
nications made by officers or employees of subsidiaries or corporate personnel who have dealt
adversely with the corporate client.
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case of privilege. 2 Moreover, the dissent argued that in the instant
case the law firm's activities consisted of a "factual investigation
and business recommendations"3 that could have been performed
by private investigators, accountants, bankers, or "any person pos-
sessing ordinary common sense and business prudence."74 Although
agreeing in principle with much of the majority's opinion, Judge
Henley nevertheless concluded that the attorney-client privilege
should not be extended to the facts of the instant case. s
IV. COMMENT
The instant decision is the first court of appeals ruling on the
issue of which employees may speak for the corporate client since
the Supreme Court's evenly divided affirmance of the Harper deci-
sion." In adopting and modifying the Harper test, the decision may
signal a reversal of the trend favoring the "control group" test."
More importantly, the modifications adopted create a sensible,
moderate standard that does not unduly restrict or expand the class
of employees who may speak for the corporation. By extending the
class of clients beyond corporate decisionmakers, the modified test
assures that counsel may gather information in legitimate situations
without concern that an opposing party may discover the informa-
tion in subsequent litigation.78 In addition, the test precludes fun-
neling documents through counsel to avoid disclosure by requiring
that employee communications be made to secure legal advice.79
The modified test combines two previously separate requirements
of the attorney-client privilege: first, that the communicating em-
ployee be qualified to speak for the corporation and second, that the
communication be made to secure legal advice. The modified test
makes the second element a precondition of the first, thereby em-
phasizing the importance of resolving correctly the legal-nonlegal
issue.
72. Id. at 614.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 615. The dissent also noted that the president of petitioner corporation had
indicated he did not believe that petitioner had retained the law firm as a legal advisor, id.
at 614, and that the law firm had warned the Board of Directors that a serious disclosure
problem might arise. Id. at 615; see note 6 supra.
75. Id. at 616. Judge Henley agreed with the majority that neither the June memo nor
the corporate minutes were privileged except to the extent that they revealed privileged
information. Id. at 612.
76. Since 1970, several district courts but no courts of appeal have addressed this
question. See notes 26 & 30 supra.
77. Id.
78. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
79. See notes 20, 31 & 62-64 supra and accompanying text.
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In resolving the legal-nonlegal issue, the court adopted the Wig-
more standard, which states that absent a clear showing to the
contrary, a matter committed to a professional legal advisor is
prima facie committed to secure legal advice. The dissent's criti-
cism of the Wigmore standard-that a party seeking discovery will
have no means available to overcome the prima facie case 8 5-is ex-
aggerated because the discovering party may always question op-
posing counsel about the capacity in which he was employed.8' Nev-
ertheless, the standard provides an inappropriate means by which
to determine whether a lawyer has acted in a legal capacity. In cases
in which the facts are complex and difficult to resolve, the presump-
tion will seriously handicap the discovering party, contravening the
well-reasoned policy in favor of narrow construction of the attorney-
client privilege.82 Furthermore, the Wigmore presumption conflicts
with the accepted judicial method of examining each document
individually to determine whether it should be privileged. 3 The
presumption is a broad rule of convenience which in close cases may
protect nonlegal documents, a result courts sought to avoid in re-
jecting the United Shoe "relationship" approach.
The instant court did not rely solely on the Wigmore presump-
tion to answer the question whether legal services had been sought.
It went on to examine the facts of the case, and in so doing, illus-
trated the difficulty courts have encountered in resolving the legal-
nonlegal issue in close factual situations.,, Both the majority and
dissenting opinions implicitly assumed that an activity is nonlegal
if a layman could perform it.8" The policy of strict construction
justifies such a presumption.87 If conclusive, however, the presump-
tion would stifle involvement of lawyers in new and useful activi-
ties.8 Therefore, the presumption should be rebuttable upon a clear
80. See text accompanying note 72 supra.
81. See note 14 supra.
82. See notes 16 & 17 supra and accompanying text.
83. See notes 39-48 supra and accompanying text.
84. The Wigmore presumption also conflicts with the established rule that the claimant
of the privilege has the burden of proving the elements of the privilege. See note 34 supra.
Moreover, few courts or commentators have followed the presumption. See Simon, supra note
18, at 977 n.81. But cf. Note, Functional Overlap, supra note 17, at 1235 (recommending that
all communications with licensed attorneys be privileged, unless the client is "obviously" not
consulting the lawyer in a professional capacity).
85. See notes 57-61 supra and accompanying text.
86. See notes 61, 67 & 74 supra and accompanying text.
87. Also justifying this presumption is the argument that it is unfair to extend the
privilege if a lawyer is performing an activity and deny it if a layman is performing precisely
the same activity.
88. See Note, Functional Overlap, supra note 17, at 1235 ("[t]o limit the attorney-
client privilege to tasks historically performed by lawyers is to beg the question whether these
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showing that lawyers should perform the activity in question. 9 In
the instant case, of course, this presumption would not have oper-
ated because the majority and dissent could not agree whether a
layman could have made the necessary analysis and recommenda-
tions." When the factual determination is so close, a court should
resolve doubts against the privilege" unless, as above, the party
claiming the privilege can demonstrate persuasively that lawyers
should perform the activity.
The suggested analysis thus should proceed in several steps.
First, the court should examine each activity or communication to
determine if it is legal or nonlegal, thereby resolving cases in which
the material clearly falls into either category. Second, if the commu-
nication or activity contains both legal and nonlegal elements, the
court should employ the "predominance" test to resolve the legal-
nonlegal issue. Third, if the court cannot ascertain clearly whether
a specific activity is legal or nonlegal, it should determine whether
laymen could perform the activity; if so, it should be classified as
nonlegal, subject to persuasive argument that lawyers should per-
form the activity. Finally, if the court cannot decide whether lay-
men could perform the activity, it should resolve doubts against the
privilege, again subject to the counter policy arguments. Such an
new functions are proper and ought to be privileged currently").
An excellent example of what might be an important new function for lawyers is the law
firm's investigation in the instant case. A similar investigation occurred in 1975 when, as part
of an SEC consent agreement, Gulf Oil Corporation appointed New York lawyer John J.
McCloy to a fact-finding committee to investigate the political contributions Gulf had made
to foreign governments. A number of attorneys from Mr. McCloy's firm aided in the investiga-
tion and the committee's recommendations were similar to those made by the law firm in
the instant position. N.Y. Times, June 12, 1975, at 53, col. 4; id., Dec. 31, 1975, at 35, col. 2.
The SEC viewed the fact-finding committee as a way of augmenting the agency's small
enforcement staff. Id. at 35, col. 1. Cf. Wall St. J., April 8, 1976, at 6, col. 3 (SEC enforcement
chief Stanley Sporkin in a speech regarding bribery disclosures urges corporations to make
greater use of the SEC voluntary disclosure program).
89. The majority in the instant opinion essentially argued this position. See text accom-
panying note 68 supra. Such an inquiry would have the added advantage of making courts
recognize that in characterizing an activity as "legal" or "nonlegal" in a close situation, they
are making a policy choice rather than an objective factual determination. In clear factual
settings a court may determine that the activity has more "legal" than "nonlegal" character-
istics; but when the activity is unclear, the legal consequences of choosing a particular label
may well determine the choice of labels. See Simon, supra note 18, at 973 ("in a case where
too much valuable evidence would be insulated by the privilege being accorded to house
counsel, a court might be disposed to find that house counsel was actually functioning in a
business capacity"). See generally McCoy, Logic vs. Value Judgment in Legal and Ethical
Thought, 23 VAND. L. REv. 1277 (1970). If courts recognize that they are making a policy
choice, they will be more likely to justify their conclusions with more than a conclusory
statement that the activity is "legal."
90. See notes 66 & 74 supra and accompanying text.
91. Here again the justification is the policy of strict construction.
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analysis would adopt existing principles that have proved useful in
defining the scope of the attorney-client privilege, would comport
with the policy of strict construction, and would provide a system-
atic framework for courts to use in analyzing the legal-nonlegal issue
within the attorney-client privilege.2
JAMES S. HUTOHINSON
Constitutional Law-Confrontation
Clause-Admission at Trial of Slain Informant's
Prior Grand Jury Testimony Against Defendants
Does Not Violate Confrontation Guarantee
Despite Lack of Cross-Examination
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Defendants appealed their federal convictions for distribution
of heroin' on the ground that the trial court erred in admitting into
evidence an informant's grand jury testimony.2 The informant had
assisted a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) investigation by pur-
chasing heroin from defendants under police surveillance.3 The in-
formant attested to the veracity of prepared statements document-
ing the undercover transactions before the grand jury, but his subse-
quent murder prevented similar testimony at trial.4 Defendants con-
92. The problem with the balancing approach described in note 57 supra is that it
provides little guidance to courts in how to analyze the legal-nonlegal issue. The author
admits this difficulty but states that "courts might in time acquire the facility with balancing
that accompanies its frequent use." Note, Fixed Rules, supra note 17, at 479. But, because
the legal-nonlegal issue is only one element within what is often a minor procedural issue-the
question of the attorney-client privilege-it is unlikely that district courts will confront the
issue often enough to acquire facility in balancing, and even less likely that courts of appeal
or the Supreme Court will have occasion to clarify matters. In contrast, the approach sug-
gested in this Recent Case suggests new methods of analysis that are easily applied and
adopts analytical methods that are familiar to courts and that have proved workable.
1. The charge agaiist defendants also included possession with intent to distribute
heroin. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1970) prohibits each of these acts.
2. Defendants contended that admission of grand jury testimony at trial in the absence
of the declarant interfered with their right of cross-examination and deprived the jury of the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness. See note 9 infra and accompanying text.
3. DEA agents took elaborate measures to document the drug transactions thoroughly.
The agents monitored and recorded each sale through a transmitter carried by the informant,
took photographs of the purchases in progress, and prepared statements afterwards with the
cooperation of the informant concerning what had been done. The agents testified at the trial
about their observations.
4. The government did not charge the defendants with the murder, nor did it introduce
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tended that the prepared statements attested to before the grand
jury were inadmissible hearsay because they did not possess suffi-
cient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness required by Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5),5 and also that the absence of cross-
examination at trial violated the requirements of the confrontation
clause.' The district court ruled the grand jury testimony admissible
under rule 804(b)(5) because it was essential and trustworthy under
the circumstances. On appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, held, affirmed. When the declarant is unavailable to testify
at trial, the federal rules of evidence and the confrontation clause
permit admission of grand jury testimony at trial if surrounding
circumstances provide substantial guarantees of trustworthiness
and indicia of reliability for the trier of fact to judge the credibility
of the witness and the truthfulness of his testimony. United States
v. West, 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978).
evidence suggesting the defendants were responsible.
5. FED. M. EVD. 804(b) defines exceptions to the hearsay rule when the declarant is
unavailable to appear at trial. It provides in part:
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(5) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trust-
worthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence
of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it
is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests
of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.
However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the
proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the
trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare
to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including
the name and address of the declarant.
Rule 804(b) contains four other exceptions: (1) former testimony given as a witness at a
prior trial or hearing when subject to cross-examination; (2) statements made under belief of
impending death (dying declarations); (3) statements made against the declarant's interest;
and (4) statements made by the declarant about his personal or family history. See FED. R.
Evm. 804(b)(1)-(4).
6. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI provides in part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to be confronted with
the witnesses against him [and] to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor . ..
7. In the companion case of United States v. Garner, 474 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1978), the
court found the incriminating grand jury testimony of a coconspirator admissible under Far.
R. Evm. 804(b) (5) on the grounds that refusal to testify at trial constitutes unavailability and
that the surrounding circumstances provided guarantees of trustworthiness. The court did not
reach the confrontation issue, finding that the declarant's agreement to allow the defense to
conduct cross-examination satisfied the constitutional guarantee. Judge Widener noted that
he dissented on the grounds he stated in United States v. West, the instant case.
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1-[. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The common-law hearsay rule prohibited the use of extrajudi-
cial statements to show the truth of matters asserted at trial in civil
and criminal cases.8 In order to safeguard the credibility of evidence
presented for proof, the rule required a witness to testify under oath
at trial, in the presence of the trier of fact, and subject to cross-
examination.' Because a literal reading of the rule would exclude
many classes of reliable testimony, however, the courts developed
exceptions to the hearsay iule, admitting out-of-court statements
when the declarant's presence was immaterial or he was unavailable
to testify at trial. 10 Modern commentators have criticized the
common-law hearsay exceptions as arbitrary and have suggested
that the hearsay rule be lifted whenever evidence is sufficiently
trustworthy and necessary." The recently adopted Federal Rules of
Evidence track the common-law treatment of the hearsay rule, in-
corporating several of the specific exceptions recognized at common
law and also including a residual exception that allows the admis-
sion of evidence having "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness" equivalent to evidence admitted under the established excep-
tions.12 The general policy expressed by the federal rules indicates
8. See C. MComICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 246 (2d ed. 1972). See generally J.
WIGMORE, 5 WIOMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1360-94 (rev. ed. J. Chadbourn 1974).
9. See FED. R. Evm. Art. VIII, Introductory Note: The Hearsay Problem [hereinafter
cited as The Hearsay Problem], J. WEimsTEI & M. BERGER, 4 WkwsmNj's EVIDENCE at
800 [011 (1977) [hereinafter cited as WVm sTE.]; McCoRMICK, supra note 8, at § 245;
Maguire, The Hearsay System: Around and Through the Thicket, 14 VAN. L. REv. 741,743-
49 (1961). Professor Wigmore insisted that cross-examination provided the fundamental test
of hearsay. 5 WioMoRE, supra note 8 at § 1362. But see DiCarlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364
(2d Cir. 1925), in which Judge Learned Hand observed:
The possibility that the jury may accept as the truth the earlier statements in preference
to those made upon the stand is indeed real, but we find no difficulty in it. If, from all
that the jury see of the witness, they conclude that what he says now is not the truth,
but what he said before, they are none the less deciding from what they see and hear of
that person and in court. There is no mythical necessity that the case must be decided
only in accordance with the truth of words uttered under oath in court.
Id. at 368.
10. The exceptions developed at common law permitted admission of declarations
against interest, dying declarations, statements of family history, and former testimony. See
MCCORMICK, supra note 8, at § 253.
11. See The Hearsay Problem, supra note 9; McCoRMICK, supra note 8, at §§ 261, 281.
See, e.g., Note, Preserving the Right to Confrontation-A New Approach to Hearsay Evi-
dence in Criminal Trials, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 749-68 (1965).
12. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5). Recognizing the potential conflict between liberalization
.of hearsay standards and the constitutional guarantee of confrontation, the drafters of the
rules wrote the residual exceptions in terms of exemption from the hearsay rules rather than
in positive terms of admissibility. See The Hearsay Problem, supra note 9. See also FED. R.
EvID. 803. Rule 803(24) employs the same language as Rule 804(b)(5) for circumstances in
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a preference for live testimony before the trier of fact, but
"trustworthy" hearsay is admissible if the alternative is the loss of
necessary evidence. 3
Although the trend in the law of evidence is toward greater
admissibility of hearsay, the sixth amendment confrontation clause
presents a countervailing consideration in the criminal law.14 Read
literally, the clause imposes an absolute bar against the presenta-
tion of testimony by an out-of-court witness against a criminal de-
fendant. The Supreme Court, however, although addressing the
confrontation clause infrequently until the last decade," has never
interpreted the clause as absolutely foreclosing the use of extrajudi-
cial testimony. In Mattox v. United States"5 the Court held testi-
which the availability of the declarant is immaterial. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 9, at
804(b)(5)[01].
13. See FEn. R. Evm. 804(b), Advisory Committee's Note.
14. See McCoRmcK, supra note 8, at § 252. For theoretical studies of the right of
confrontation, see 5 WiaMOnE, supra note 8, at §§ 1395-1400; Baker, The Right to Confronta-
tion, the Hearsay Rules, and Due Process-A Proposal for Determining When Hearsay May
Be Used in Criminal Trials, 6 CONN. L. REV. 529 (1974); Graham, The Right of Confrontation
and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CmM. L. BULL. 99 (1972);
Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal
Cases, 91 HAnv. L. Ray. 567 (1978); Note, Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule, 75 YALE L.J.
1434 (1966).
15. The infrequency of confrontation decisions prior to 1965 is commonly explained by
the inapplicability of the clause to the states prior to that date and the Supreme Court's
control over rules of hearsay for the federal courts. See The Hearsay Problem, supra note 9;
The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HAv. L. Rnv. 38, 189 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1970
Term].
16. 156 U.S. 237 (1895). This decision contains dictum that is often cited as presenting
the classical view of the confrontation clause:
The primary object of the . . . [confrontation clause] . . . was to prevent depositions
or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against
the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in
which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting
the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury
in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the
manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief. There is doubtless
reason for saying that the accused should never lose the benefit of any of these safeguards
even by the death of the witness; and that, if notes of his testimony are permitted to be
read, [the defendant] is deprived of the advantage of that personal presence of the
witness before the jury which the law has designed for his protection. But general rules
of law of this kind, however beneficient in their operation and valuable to the accused,
must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the
case. To say that a criminal, after having once been convicted by the testimony of a
certain witness, should go scot free simply because death has closed the mouth of that
witness, would be carrying his constitutional protection to an unwarrantable extent. The
law in its wisdom declares that the rights of the public shall not be wholly sacrificed in
order that an incidental benefit may be preserved to the accused.
Id. at 242.43. The Court in an earlier consideration of the first trial stated that the hearsay
exception for dying declarations had continuing validity under federal law. See Mattox v.
United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892).
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mony of a deceased witness in a previous murder trial admissible
against the defendant on retrial because the earlier cross-
examination provided sufficient confrontation. While acknowledg-
ing that the clause was inteided to prevent the use of depositions
or ex parte affidavits in lieu of testimony subject to cross-
examination, the Mattox Court nonetheless found that a hearsay
exception for dying declarations was a part of the common law at
the sixth amendment's adoption and thus was incorporated by the
confrontation clause. 17 In addition, the Court determined that prior
cross-examination of a subsequently deceased witness satisfied con-
frontation clause requirements.'8 Under the Mattox Court's inter-
pretation of the confrontation right, the hearsay rules of the early
common law coexisted with the confrontation guarantee without
conflict, perhaps due to the limited nature and stability of the hear-
say exceptions. In Snyder v. Massachusetts," Justice Cardozo
viewed the confrontation privilege as a dynamic concept interre-
lated with the developing notions of procedural due process and the
right to a fair trial. In holding that the trial court's refusal to allow
the defendant to accompany the jury on a view did not violate the
clause, the Snyder Court reasoned that the exceptions to the con-
frontation guarantee could be expanded if its basic purposes were
not infringed. 0 The Court's application of due process language to
confrontation issues indicated a willingness to use due process anal-
ysis to define the bottom line at which the expanding hearsay rules
would violate confrontation rights.2'
Consideration of the confrontation issue increased dramatically
following Pointer v. Texas,2 2 in which the Court identified the con-
frontation right as a fundamental liberty applicable to state law
under the fourteenth amendment. The Pointer Court rejected the
state court decision that a state is not obligated to produce a witness
at trial who is absent from its jurisdiction,m ruling that the use of
testimony from a preliminary hearing at which the defendant was
17. 156 U.S. at 243. See McConwIcK, supra note 8, at § 252.
18. 156 U.S. at 244.
19. 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
20. Id: at 107.
21. See The Hearsay Problem, supra note 9. See also Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474
(1959) (revocation of security clearance without confrontation and cross-examination held
unauthorized); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (cross-examination ruled essential to due
process in state contempt proceeding); Delaney v. United States, 263 U.S. 586 (1924) (decla-
rations of a coconspirator found admissible under confrontation clause); Motes v. United
States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900) (admission of previously cross-examined preliminary hearing
testimony denied when declarant's absence caused by negligence of the government).
22. 380 U.S. 400 (1965). See text accompanying note 17 supra.
23. See Pointer v. State, 375 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tex. Crim. 1964).
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not represented by counsel deprived the defendant of the right of
cross-examination secured by the confrontation clause.24 The Court
implied that cross-examination was a corollary requirement of the
confrontation guarantee, explaining that exceptions such as those
recognized in Mattox fell outside the scope of the constitutional
rule.2s In the companion case Douglas v. Alabama, 2 the Court held
inadmissible an extrajudicial statement of "crucial importance" to
the state's case because the declarant's subsequent refusal to testify
at trial based on his privilege against self-incrimination made his
cross-examination impossible.27 In these decisions, unlike Snyder,
the Court expressed no discernible substantive distinction in the
analyses under the confrontation clause and the hearsay rule, sug-
gesting that the Court might freeze further expansion of the hearsay
exceptions by reading them into the Constitution. 2
In subsequent decisions the Warren Court refined the
Pointer/Douglas interpretation of the confrontation right as defined
in light of defendants' interest in cross-examination. In Barber v.
Page2s the Court held that the state had violated the defendant's
rights under the confrontation clause by failing to produce at trial
a declarant who was then in prison in a neighboring state. In dic-
tum, the Court identified two limitations on the right of confronta-
tion. First, a witness may be ruled excusably "unavailable" at trial,
provided the prosecution makes a "good-faith" effort to secure the
witness' presence. Second, cross-examination of a witness by de-
fense counsel prior to trial may be sufficient to satisfy the confronta-
tion right if the testimony is necessary and the witness is unavaila-
ble at trial.s Thus, while defining the limits of the confrontation
24. Rather than addressing the confrontation issue, the Court might have reached the
same result under a hearsay doctrine interpreted in light of a constitutional right to counsel.
See The Hearsay Problem, supra note 9.
25. 380 U.S. at 407. The Pointer Court noted that "It cannot seriously be doubted...
that the right of cross-examination is included in the right of an accused in a criminal case
to confront the witnesses against him." Id. at 404. Accord, Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1
(1966). The Brookhart Court stated that a denial of cross-examination "would be constitu-
tional error of the first magnitude and no amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure
it." Id. at 3.
26. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
27. The prior statement in Douglas was a confession by the defendant's alleged ac-
complice that implicated the defendant. Id. at 417.
28. See Note, supra note 14.
29. 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
30. Id. at 725. Though recognizing that such exceptions might be allowed in some cases,
the Court attached strong significance to the right of cross-examination at trial. "The right
to confrontation is basically a trial right ... . A preliminary hearing is ordinarily a much
less searching exploration into the merits of a case than a trial, simply because its function




guarantee, the Barber Court also outlined constitutional limits on
the expansion of hearsay exceptions in criminal trials. In Bruton v.
United States3' the Court reaffirmed the significance of cross-
examination as a component of the confrontation guarantee32 and
again implied that the limitations placed on admissibility by the
confrontation clause and the rules of hearsay were coextensive."
Although insisting that its analysis was harmonious with that
of prior decisions, the Court in California v. Green34 challenged the
position that the confrontation clause guarantee was identical in
scope to the hearsay rule.3 5 The Court failed, however, to provide a
satisfactory distinction between the analyses under the rules." The
California Supreme Court had found statements made at a prelimi-
nary hearing inadmissible because the declarant's inability to recall
that testimony at trial rendered cross-examination ineffective. 3 The
Court reversed, holding that when such testimony is necessary, sur-
rounding circumstances provide reasonable indicia of reliability,
and the prosecution is unable to present the evidence in a more
reliable form, cross-examination at trial constitutes adequate con-
frontation even if the witness cannot recall the prior statement.
The emphasis on reliability in Green's confrontation analysis was
similar to that of a liberalized hearsay exception, undermining the
Court's assertion that the rule and the clause were different in
scope. Whereas the Court previously had employed confrontation
analysis to restrict expansion of the hearsay rules, Green utilized the
31. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
32. Id. at 126. The Bruton Court rejected the government's argument that the admis-
sion into evidence of a codefendant's confession to a third party was not prejudicial error
because of its facial unreliability. The Court held that the admission of the confession into
evidence created a substantial risk that the jury would disregard the trial court's limiting
instructions and find the defendant guilty on the basis of the uncross-examined confession.
Id.
33. Id. at 136 n.12. See Graham, supra note 14, at 116.
34. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
35. The Court argued that Pointer and Barber had found confrontation violations in
situations in which evidence had been admitted under "arguably recognized hearsay
exception[s]." Id. at 156.
36. See Graham, supra note 14, at 119.
37. See People v. Green, 70 Cal. 2d 654, 657 n.1, 451 P.2d 422, 424 n.1, 75 Cal. Rptr.
782, 784 n.1 (1969).
38. 399 U.S. at 167 n.16. Without citation, the Court enumerated several instances in
which a witness would be declared "unavailable" for purposes of the confrontation clause,
rendering admission of prior statements constitutional. These were loss of memory, plea of
fifth amendment privilege, and refusal of the witness to answer. Id. at 167-68. As the majority
notes, these exception, are no different from those previously recognized under the hearsay
rule. Id. at 168 n.17.
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liberalization of hearsay rules to expand the confrontation excep-
tions .31
Continuing the emphasis on reliability articulated in Green, a
plurality of the Burger Court in Dutton v. Evans0 held the state-
ment of an absent and previously unconfronted witness admissible
because it possessed sufficient indicia of reliability and contained
no information that was crucial or devastating.41 The Court's re-
statement of the confrontation clause emphasized that the clause
was intended to advance a practical concern for the accuracy of the
truth-determining process in criminal cases by providing a satisfac-
tory basis for the trier of fact to evaluate the truth of prior state-
ments. 2 The Dutton Court additionally noted that confrontation
requirements might be even less restrictive than federal hearsay
requirements if the policies underlying the clause were sufficiently
protected." In a sharply worded dissent Justice Marshall warned
39. In concurrence, Justice Harlan rejected the equation of the confrontation and hear-
say rule standards of admissibility, arguing that confrontation only supplies a minimum
requirement that the prosecution must produce available witnesses whose declarations it
intends to use at trial. Id. at 174. Thus construed, the clause does not demand cross-
examination to establish reliability, but merely indicates a preference for direct testimony
over hearsay evidence. See Westen, supra note 14, at 614. Reviving the due process analysis
of Snyder, Justice Harlan indicated that due process considerations reinforce the confronta-
tion clause, entitling defendants to a separate determination of the reliability of any hearsay
evidence under those standards. 399 U.S. at 186 n.20. He noted:
I would not permit a conviction to stand where the critical issues at trial were supported
only by ex porte testimony not subjected to cross-examination, and not found to be
reliable by the trial judge . . . . Due process also requires that the defense be given
ample opportunity to alert the jury to the pitfalls of accepting hearsay at face value, and
the defendant would, of course, upon request be entitled to cautionary instructions.
Id. at 186.87 n.20. Therefore, while the confrontation clause supplies a minimum constitu-
tional hearsay requirement relating to the availability of the declarant, Justice Harlan's
scheme emphasized due process considerations of reliability rather than the opportunity for
cross-examination. By limiting the role of the confrontation right, Justice Harlan's framework
lessened the chance for conflict between the confrontation clause and the hearsay rules and
provided a significant opportunity for greater clarity of analysis.
40. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
41. Id. at 87.
42. Id. at 89 (citing California v. Green).
43. Id. at 81. The out.of-court statements used against the defendant in Dutton were
admitted under a Georgia statute allowing statements of a conspirator to be admissible
against his coconspirators. Id. at 78. See 1970 Term, supra note 15, at 188-90.
Although continuing to insist that due process provides the appropriate constitutional
standard for admissibility of evidence, Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Dutton aban-
doned his previous position in Green that the confrontation clause compels the presentation
of available witnesses by the prosecution. Apparently deciding that his preferential rule might
produce an inflexible liberalization of the hearsay exceptions, Harlan stated that the confron-
tation clause merely guarantees the right to cross-examine while the rules of evidence govern
admissibility standards. 400 U.S. at 94. Thus, Harlan's position in Dutton continued his
earlier restrictive view of the scope of the confrontation clause, but additionally limited the
clause by eliminating the requirement of production of available witnesses. For discussions
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that admission of out-of-court statements on the basis of a lenient
"indicia of reliability" standard diluted the right to confrontation
and cross-examination previously afforded by the Court.4
Since Dutton, a number of United States circuit courts have
considered the interplay of the hearsay rules and the confrontation
clause.45 In United States v. Fiore" the Second Circuit held the
sworn statement of a narcotics informant before a grand jury inad-
missible at trial when the informant refused to testify and be cross-
examined. Citing Douglas v. Alabama, the court found that both
the hearsay rule and the confrontation clause barred admission of
the grand jury testimony in the absence of cross-examination.4" Al-
though Fiore was factually distinguishable from Dutton and Green,
the Second Circuit's opinion indicated a reluctance to utilize a relia-
bility standard to admit grand jury testimony into evidence at trial.
In a similar case, the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Carlson"
determined that rule 804(b)(5) permitted admission at trial of the
challenged grand jury testimony, finding it sufficiently trustworthy.
of Justice Harlan's change of position, see Westen, supra note 14, at 614-18; Baker, supra note
14, at 534-38, 544-46.
44. See 400 U.S. at 110 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall strenuously criti-
cized the majority's use of an "indicia of reliability" test to resolve the question of admissibil-
ity:
If "indicia of reliability" are so easy to come by, and prove so much, then it is only
reasonable to ask whether the Confrontation Clause has any independent vitality at all
in protecting a criminal defendant against the use of extrajudicial statements not subject
to cross-examination and not exposed to a jury assessment of the declarant's demeanor
at trial. I believe the Confrontation Clause has been sunk if any out-of-court statement
bearing an indicium of a probative likelihood can come in, no matter how damaging the
statement may be or how great the need for the truth-discovering test of cross-
examination.
Id. Justice Marshall also found unacceptable Justice Harlan's view of due process "which
would prohibit only irrational or unreasonable evidentiary rulings." Id. n.11.
Two Supreme Court cases have considered the confrontation clause since Dutton. In
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) the Court held that the trial court had denied
the defendant due process by refusing to permit the defendant to cross-examine a witness
who had repudiated his own confession of the crime. See Natali, Green, Dutton and Cham-
bers: Three Cases in Search of a Theory, 7 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 43, 53-54 (1975); Westen, supra
note 14, at 601-13.
In an earlier confrontation case, the Court in Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972),
distinguished Barber in holding that Tennessee was powerless to compel the appearance of a
witness who had moved permanently to Sweden prior to defendant's second trial. Because
the witness was unavailable, his recorded testimony at the earlier trial was ruled admissible
due to the "indicia of reliability" provided by earlier cross-examination.
45. See also United States v. Gonzalez, 559 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Rogers, 549 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918 (1977); United States v. Payne,
492 F.2d 449 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 876 (1974).
46. 443 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1971).
47. Id. at 115.
48. 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
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The court further held that the defendant had waived his rights
under the confrontation clause by causing the declarant to refuse to
testify throukh intimidation."9 Noting that the contours of the con-
frontation clause had not been "clearly defined" by previous Su-
preme Court decisions, the court reserved the general issue of ad-
missibility at trial of grand jury testimony under the confrontation
clause in view of its "wide ramifications in the criminal justice
system." Thus, while intimating that the new rules of evidence had
greatly liberalized the hearsay rule, the court was hesitant to rule
that the confrontation requirements had undergone similar liberali-
zation.
III. THE INSTANT OPINION
Although asserting that both the hearsay rule and the confron-
tation clause are initially concerned with the reliability of evidence,
the instant court undertook separate factual analyses under each
rule. In applying the hearsay rule, the court interpreted rule
804(b)(5) as sanctioning admission of the statement of an unavaila-
ble declarant if it possesses circumstantial guarantees of reliability
equivalent to the guarantees of reliability provided under the recog-
nized exceptions. Although acknowledging that the residual clause
should be used only in exceptional circumstances, the court found
its application proper because of the detailed verification proce-
dures employed and the collaboration by the government agents., '
The court thus determined that the declarant's statement need not
possess guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to the guarantees
of prior testimony subjected to cross-examination, ruling the state-
ment admissible because it easily satisfied the less demanding
trustworthiness standard applicable to dying declarations and
statements against penal interest. 2
The court, in considering the confrontation issue, initially
premised that the prosecution must produce available witnesses for
live testimony and cross-examination by the defense. 3 The court
stated that when the declarant is unavailable, extrajudicial state-
ments are admissible under the clause only if accompanied by suffi-
cient badges of reliability, thus requiring the court to make a second
49. Id. at 1357.
50. Weinstein criticizes the result in this case, warning that "Rule 804(b)(5) should not
become an automatic formula for introducing uncross.examined grand jury statements."
WuISFEIN, supra note 9, at 116 (Supp. 1977) (supplementing I 804(b)(5)[011).
51. United States v. West, 574 F.2d at 1135, 1137-38 (4th Cir. 1978). See note 3 supra.




analysis of the facts.5 Noting the presumption of previous Supreme
Court decisions that cross-examined testimony is more reliable than
testimony not subject to cross-examination, the court nonetheless
argued that surrounding circumstances may give assurances of reli-
ability and trustworthiness to prior recorded statements compara-
ble to those provided by the recognized confrontation exceptions.5
The court acknowledged the similarity between its confrontation
and hearsay analyses, concluding that even in the absence of cross-
examination, the instant circumstances provided the jury with a
sufficient basis for judging the credibility and truthfulness of the
witness under the confrontation clause as well as under the hearsay
rule." Finally, the court denied that Dutton's emphasis on the
'"crucial" or "devastating" nature of the evidence in determining
admissibility 7 was meant to impose a sliding standard of reliability
dependent on the possible prejudicial effect on the jury. The court
argued that a variable standard would be unworkable and that the
basic reliability requirements imposed by the confrontation clause
should apply to all evidence sought to be admitted. 8 The dissent,
in addition to asserting that the grand jury testimony failed to sat-
isfy the rule 804(b)(5) test of trustworthiness, contended that the
majority had confused the hearsay and confrontation issues by
treating them under the same standard. Citing Supreme Court
language indicating that the two rules are not identical,"0 the dissent
argued that the majority had reduced the constitutional guarantee
of confrontation to a mere rule of evidence." The dissent interpreted
the confrontation clause as providing a threshold level of protection
that assures an opportunity for the defendant to cross-examine his
accusers and for the jury to evaluate witnesses' demeanor, thereby
preventing prosecution by ex parte affidavit." Acknowledging that
the Supreme Court has developed exceptions to the confrontation
rule, the dissent suggested that the majority's decision would have
been less objectionable had it been based on an extension of the
dying declarations exception to the confrontation clause to include
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1137.
56. Id. at 1138.
57. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
58. The court pointed out that even hearsay evidence with only a slight prejudicial
effect should not be admissible without some guarantees of reliability. 574 F.2d at 1138.
59. Id. at 1139 (Widener, J., dissenting).
60. Id. (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970)).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1140 (citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895)). See text accompa-
nying notes 16-18 supra.
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instances in which a grand jury declarant had been slain prior to
trial." The dissent concluded that liberalization of the hearsay ex-
ceptions had no effect on previously developed constitutional doc-
trines and that the majority's use of the federal rules to create new
exceptions to the confrontation clause was unwarranted.64
IV. COMMENT
The instant decision applies Dutton's "indicia of reliability"
standard to reach the first unqualified holding that the admission
of uncross-examined grand jury testimony against a criminal de-
fendant does not violate the confrontation clause. 5 Unlike the evi-
dence admitted in Dutton, the testimony in the instant case was
crucial to the determination of guilt and devastating to the de-
fense."6 The significance of this testimony heightened the defen-
dant's interest in cross-examination, demonstrating the inadequacy
of the reliability standard as-a substitute for the confrontation guar-
antee. Although the majority correctly asserted that the instant case
presented exceptional circumstances sufficient to satisfy the rule
804(b)(5) hearsay exception, its adoption of hearsay analysis for the
confrontation issue does not explain satisfactorily how the circum-
stantial reliability of the evidence adequately protects a criminal
defendant's crucial interest in challenging testimony through cross-
examination. Furthermore, the court has placed itself in apparent
conflict with the rationale of earlier Supreme Court holdings in
Douglas and Bruton that the confrontation clause guarantees the
right to cross-examination.67 Although the analysis in Dutton, like
that in the instant case, presented inconsistencies with Douglas and
Bruton, the unconfronted evidence in Dutton was of considerably
less import than that in the instant case.
In focusing on reliability to decide both the confrontation and
hearsay issues, the instant court belied its position that a separate
determination of the hearsay and confrontation issues was re-
quired." Indeed, the instant court intimated that the same circum-
63. Id. at 1140.
64. The dissent suggested that the majority's decision was in conflict with United
States v. Fiore, 443 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1971). See text accompanying notes 46-47 supra.
65. See text accompanying notes 45-50 supra.
66. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
67. See text accompanying notes 26-28 and 31-33 supra.
68. See text accompanying note 54 supra. By insisting that the confrontation clause
requires the production of available witnesses and in making a "separate determination" of
the reliability of evidence, the instant court adopted a method of analysis similar to that
suggested by Justice Harlan in Green. See note 39 supra. Whereas Justice Harlan found that
constitutional due process considerations require that out-of-court testimony by an unavaila-
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stances should logically suffice to meet both standards. This result
renders the confrontation clause substantively meaningless in cases
in which an out-of-court declarant is unavailable for trial. Clearly,
however, the inclusion of the clause in the sixth amendment was
intended to acknowledge and protect the interests of criminal de-
fendants in confronting the evidence used to prosecute them. This
right is based on the presumption that because of the potential life
or liberty interests of the defendant, the need to guarantee reliabil-
ity of evidence is greater in criminal than in civil trials. The instant
court's analysis totally undermines this constitutional presumption
by its application of the easily manipulated reliability requirement.
Although insisting that the majority's analysis improperly sub-
stituted a reliability standard for the sixth amendment guarantee
of confrontation and cross-examination," the dissent did not direct
its attention to the practical effects of prohibiting the prosecution's
use of uncross-examined testimony from an unavailable declarant.
The dissenter's suggestion that the majority's dilemma might be
resolved by engrafting the dying declaration exception onto the rule
excusing prior cross-examined testimony from present confrontation
at triaF would narrow the class of objectionable cases without re-
solving the underlying confrontation difficulties. Thus the dissent
fosters an inaccurate perception that refusal to admit uncross-
examined testimony automatically would preclude conviction. This
perception, in turn, would improperly support an intuitive conclu-
sion that the prosecution's need for such testimony would justify a
substantial abrogation of the right guaranteed by the confrontation
clause.
Rather than eroding the confrontation guarantee by employing
reliability as a constitutional standard, the courts should find that
the confrontation clause bars the admission of uncross-examined
statements against criminal defendants at trial .7 This rule would
insulate defendants from the inherently prejudicial effects of prose-
cution by ex parte transcripts, but would not greatly diminish the
ble witness must be reliable, the instant court attributed the reliability requirement to the
confrontation clause itself. By evaluating reliability of evidence under the confrontation
clause, the instant court's framework, unlike Justice Harlan's, inevitably equates the hearsay
rules and the confrontation clause. Neither analysis, however, provides adequate weight to
the need for cross-examination in a criminal defense.
69. See text accompanying notes 59-61 supra.
70. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
71. Recognized exceptions to the confrontation right, iuch as the dying declarations
exception, might continue to be recognized due to the extreme prosecutorial need and the
extreme limitations that have been placed on the admission of such evidence. See text
accompanying note 17 supra.
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ability of the state to prosecute in the majority of cases. Using the
instant case to illustrate this point, the court found the declarant's
testimony to be reliable largely because of its corroboration by law
enforcement agents who testified and were cross-examined at trial.72
Because the agents' observations were exceedingly thorough in es-
tablishing the identity of the defendants and the fact of the transac-
tion, the prosecution probably could have obtained a verdict with-
out use of the unavailable declarant's testimony. In the absence of
strong corroboration, the out-of-court declarant's testimony likely
would be excluded under the majority's standard for reasons of its
unreliability and the chance for resulting prejudice, regardless of the
prosecution's need for the testimony to prove its case. Thus, when
a former declarant is not available to testify at trial, the state's case
should be required to rest solely on the testimony of corroborating
agents in order to preserve the substantive guarantees of the con-
frontation clause.
JAMES ROBERT NEWSOM DI
Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Federal
Statutes Differentiating Between Sentence Credit
for Probation and Parole Time Satisfy Rational
Basis Test
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Petitioner, a probation violator,' appealed the sentence im-
posed 2 at his revocation hearing after the court failed to credit
72. 574 F.2d at 1135, 1137-38. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
1. Petitioner-defendant was originally convicted of altering and publishing a Treasury
check with a forged endorsement in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 495 (1976). On October 11, 1974,
he was sentenced to three years in prison. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976), the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado ordered that petitioner be confined in a
treatment-type institution for six months, that execution of the remainder of the sentence
be suspended, that petitioner be placed on probation for two years and six months, and that
during probation petitioner participate in a drug abuse treatment program. Later, the sent-
encing judge amended the Order of Probation to require petitioner to reside and participate
in a community drug treatment center. During 1976 three probation violation warrants were
issued against petitioner. Following the issuance of the third warrant, the probation revoca-
tion hearing giving rise to this action was held on December 2, 1976. At the hearing petitioner
offered evidence in mitigation of his failure to participate in the drug treatment program.
2. The district court revoked probation and sentenced petitioner to two years in prison
with the recommendation that he participate in a drug abuse program in the institution.
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against his sentence the time he had spent on probation.3 Petitioner
asserted that the failure of the federal district court to credit the
time he had been on probation violated equal protection principles
inherent in the fifth amendment' because a newly enacted federal
statute required that such credit be given an individual whose pa-
role has been revoked.6 Respondent' contended that the purposes of
parole and probation are different and therefore that a rational basis
exists for the distinction requiring time on parole to be credited
against the violator's sentence while similar credit is not required
for time on probation. The United States District Court for the
District of Colorado denied petitioner's motion to reduce the sent-
ence and expressly refused to give petitioner credit for the time he
had been on probation. On appeal, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit, held, affirmed. Although a federal stat-
ute grants credit for time spent on parole to parolees whose parole
has been revoked, judges revoking probation may deny similar
credit to probationers without violating equal protection principles
because denying credit compels compliance by probationers with
probation terms and because federal judges can legitimately be
granted greater discretion in sentencing probationers than is given
the United States Parole Commission in sentencing parolees.
United States v. Shead, 568 F.2d 678 (10th Cir. 1978).
3. The district court did reduce petitioner's sentence from a maximum of two years and
six months to two years, recognizing that he had served six months in a treatment institution,
but did not give him full credit for the sixteen months he was on probation without an
outstanding probation violation warrant against him.
4. See Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard,
419 U.S. 498 (1975); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 440 (1973); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497, 499 (1954). See also Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal Protection,
55 N.C.L. Rsv. 541 (1977).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 4210 (1976). Effectuating regulations at 28 C.F.R. § 2.52(c) (1976)
provided that:
(c) A parolee whose release is revoked by the Commission will receive credit on service
of his sentence for time spent under supervision, except as provided below:
(1) If the Parole Board finds the parolee failed to reasonably comply with an
order of the Board, then the time during which he failed to respond is subject
to forfeiture.
(2) If the parolee is convicted of any crime subsequent to parole which permits
any term of confinement then the credit for the entire period of parole is subject
to forfeiture.
This mandatory credit treatment for time spent on parole differs from the procedure
followed in probation cases. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3653 (1976), the sentencing judge has the
discretion upon revocation of probation to require the defendant to serve the entire sentence
or any lesser term without granting credit for time served on probation.




Since its decision in Bolling v. Sharpe,7 which invalidated ra-
cial segregation in the public schools of the District of Columbia, the
Supreme Court has utilized the due process clause of the fifth
amendment 8 to prohibit arbitrary discrimination by the federal gov-
ernment in much the same manner that it has employed the four-
teenth amendment to limit similar state action.' Through the 1950's
and 1960's equal protection cases challenging both state and federal
action fell within two distinct analytical categories-those sub-
jected to a rational basis test and those required to withstand strict
scrutiny.
The rational basis test derives from the underlying philosophy
of equal protection of the laws. Ideally, legislatures should pass laws
that affect all persons equally, but in order to protect the public
welfare, they often exercise their police powers to pass laws impos-
ing special burdens upon 6r granting special benefits to particular
groups or classes of individuals.10 The demand for equalit thus
directly confronts the power to classify. In resolving this paradox,
the Court has neither abandoned the principles of equality nor de-
nied the legislature the right to classify. Taking a middle course, the
Court has resolved the demands of legislative specificity and consti-
tutional generality by adopting a doctrine of reasonable classifica-
tion, which examines both the purpose of a law and the reasonable-
ness of its classifications." Thus the Court has stated that a particu-
lar classification must be reasonable, resting upon a difference hav-
ing a "fair and substantial relation" to the purpose of the legislation
so that all persons similarly situated will be treated alike.1 2 In appli-
cation, however, the rational basis test has traditionally been a very
lax standard, particularly in the area of under-inclusive classifica-
tions, those categories that include fewer persons than logically
would be necessary to achieve the intended governmental end.' 3
7. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
8. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V provides, "No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law...
9. Karat, supra note 4, at 552.
10. L. TmB, AmmucAN CoNsTrmoNAL LAw 993-94 (1978); Tussman & tenBroek, The
Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALiF. L. REv. 341, 343-44 (1949).
11. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 10, at 343-44.
12. F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412,415 (1920). See also McLaughlin
v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
13. TmBE, supra note 10, at 997. Tussman and tenBroek define the under-inclusive
category: "All who are included in the class are tainted with the mischief, but there are others
also tainted whom the classification does not include." Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 10,
at 348.
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Under the traditional rational basis test, the Court ordinarily has
deferred to such legislative action, recognizing that legislatures are
incapable of enacting laws with mathematical certainty and often
must adopt piecemeal measures to achieve desired results."
In applying the strict scrutiny test, a much more rigorous level
of analysis, the Court has identified two situations in which the
state must demonstrate a "compelling interest" to justify any une-
qual classification. First, whenever the class of persons disadvan-
taged by unequal treatment from statutory classification is desig-
nated a "suspect class," a showing of compelling interest is re-
quired. 15 The Supreme Court has specifically limited these "suspect
classes" to race," alienage,'7 and nationality. 8 Second, the Court
will require a showing of compelling interest when the individual
interest affected by the unequal classification is deemed a funda-
mental right. In Skinner v. Oklahoma,9 which laid the foundation
for the "fundamental rights" strand of equal protection analysis, 2°
the Court held that a law requiring certain habitual criminals to be
sterilized infringed upon the fundamental right of procreation. Thus
14. Rational basis scrutiny has been most deferential in economic regulation cases. In
Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949), which considered a municipal
statute regulating advertising displays on vehicles, the Court demonstrated a willingness to
accept any hypothetical municipal purpose sufficiently related to the classification. Id. at
110. Justice White argued in a concurring opinion that the Court should require a more
substantial relationship between the classification and the legislative purpose. Id. at 115. In
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955), a unanimous decision which upheld an
Oklahoma statute regulating opticians, the Court adopted a standard of review that would,
in effect, defer to any state purpose in the area of economic regulation. Id. at 487. The
Williamson Court further stated that an economic classification need not purport to remedy
the entire problem recognized by the legislature. Thus the Court expressly authorized
"piecemeal" legislation. Id. at 489. In McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), in which
plaintiffs challenged as underclassifying a state statute that required certain specified busi-
nesses to close on Sunday, the Court reaffirmed in a unanimous opinion the lenient standard
of review: a statutory classification would be upheld "if any set of facts reasonably may be
conceived to justify it." Id. at 426. See also Kotch v. Board of River Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S.
552 (1947); Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownnell, 294 U.S. 580 (1935); Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
15. McCoy, Recent Equal Protection Decisions-Fundamental Right to Travel or
"Newcomers" as a Suspect Class, 28 VAND. L. REV. 987, 991 (1975). See also United States
v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
16. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
17. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
18. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948). Although in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 688 (1973), a plurality opinion held sex to be a suspect category, later opinions such
as Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), and Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975), have
retreated from this formulation. In both Craig and Stanton the Court used a rational basis
test with intensified scrutiny. See notes 28-33 infra and accompanying text.
19. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
20. McCoy, supra note 15, at 992. See also TRmE, supra note 10, at 1010.
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the Court invoked a strict scrutiny analysis to strike down the law.21
In the years after Skinner other individual rights, including voting,22
interstate travel,2s and criminal appeals, 24 were held to be funda-
mental, thereby requiring the state to demonstrate a compelling
interest when infringing upon such a right through unequal classifi-
cation.
In recent years, however, the Court has refused to expand fur-
ther the list of fundamental rights that will trigger the higher tier
of analysis. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez25
illustrates the present Court's approach to the proper scope of the
strict scrutiny test. Rodriguez rejected poverty as a suspect class
because an absolute deprivation of a governmental benefit was not
present.2 Additionally, the Court has rejected education as a funda-
mental right, finding no express guarantee for the right to education
in the Constitution?
Although restricting further expansion of the cases that will
invoke strict scrutiny, the Burger Court has increasingly indicated
a reluctance to operate within the rigid confines of traditional, two-
tiered equal protection analysis.28 In a number of areas, including
laws discriminating against aliens,21 illegitimates,0 gender, 31 and
21. 316 U.S. at 541.
22. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (overturn-
ing a state statute restricting voting in school district elections to parents of school children
and property owners); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Educ., 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966) (invalidating
state poll tax); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
23. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (overturning state and local
residency requirements for voting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
24. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1972); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
25. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Justice Powell, writing for the majority, analyzed a district court
opinion that classified education as a fundamental right and wealth as a suspect class in
overturning a Texas scheme for financing public education with local property taxes.
26. Id. at 36.37.
27. Id. at 33-34.
28. Although the Court's rejection of rigid two-tier analysis has not been expressly
acknowledged by a majority of the Court, a number of individual Justices have noted the
trend of recent decisions. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458 (1973) (White, J., concur-
ring); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (the Court has employed a "spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination
allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause"). Justice Powell, concurring in Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), stated that "there are valid reasons for dissatisfaction with the
'two-tier' approach" and added that "candor compels the recognition that the relatively
deferential 'rational basis' standard of review normally applied takes on a sharper focus when
we address a gender-based classification." Id. at 210 n.*.
29. Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976) (overturning law excluding
aliens from practice as licensed civil engineers); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (state's
interest in excluding aliens from practice of law found insufficient); Sugatman v. Dougall,
413 U.S. 634, 642-43 (1973) (while statute prohibiting employment of aliens in state civil
service rested on legitimate state interest in having loyal employees, statute was "neither
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when certain important, though not fundamental, interests are at
stake,3 the Court has applied scrutiny clearly more demanding than
a minimum rationality test, yet less exacting than strict scrutiny.
Because the evolution of this intermediate level of scrutiny has been
largely unarticulated, the circumstances in which intermediate re-
view will be applied and the specific requirements that must be
satisfied under it are unclear.3
The Burger Court's application of rational basis scrutiny to
criminal cases has produced varying results. In Marshall v. United
States3 the Court, in reviewing a statute denying felons with two
prior felony convictions the right to participate in a drug treatment
program, upheld the-classification under an intensified rational
basis test. The Court found that Congress could properly omit felons
with two or more convictions from the program because their pres-
ence might hinder successful treatment of others and because they
would constitute a greater danger to society during the nondetention
treatment program. Throughout its analysis, however, the Court
refused to give the traditional deference to congressional classifica-
tions but instead looked closely at the legislative history of the act,
its intended purpose, the classification made, and the correspond-
ence between the purpose and the classification. In James v.
narrowly confined nor precise in its application," and therefore failed); Graham v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (invalidated state statutes denying welfare benefits to aliens).
30. Trimble v. Gordon, 97 S. Ct. 1459 (1977) (invalidating Illinois statute allowing
illegitimate children to inherit by intestate succession only from their mothers); Weber v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (state may not deprive dependent illegitimate
children of recovery for death of their father under state workmen's compensation law).
31. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidating state statute distinguishing be-
tween sexes in setting legal ages for purchasing beer); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975)
(holding irrational a state statute providing for parental support obligation for sons until age
21, but for daughters only until age 18); Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (in-
validating a provision of the Social Security Act awarding survivor's benefits to widows, but
not widowers); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (invalidating a federal statute
discriminating against male spouses for purposes of military benefits); Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971) (overturning state statute giving preference to selection of males as adminis-
trators of estates).
32. See TRIBE, supra note 10, at 1089-90.
33. Professor Tribe has articulated five general techniques employed by the Court in
applying intermediate review. First, intermediate review initially assesses the importance of
the purpose or statutory objective purporting to justify the classification or limitation on
liberty. Second, intermediate review requires that a close fit must exist in that the classifica-
tions must be substantially related to the statutory purpose. Third, the purpose of the classifi-
cation must be clearly articulated without requiring the Court to supply a rationale from
hypothetical speculation or from legislative history. Fourth, the purpose of the law cannot
be provided from afterthought-an attempt to rationalize the rule once it exists. Fifth, inter-
mediate review requires legislatures to proceed in a less wholesale and more individualized
manner when sensitive matters are at stake. Id. at 1082-89.
34. 414 U.S. 417 (1974).
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Strange35 the Court employed an intermediate level of scrutiny to
invalidate a Kansas recoupment statute that denied certain protec-
tive exemptions to criminal debtors in actions by the state to recover
legal fees.3" The Court held that the imposition of such harsh condi-
tions on criminal debtors constituted a violation of the equal pro-
tection clause, absent similar treatment of civil debtors.
The Supreme Court has never considered in an equal protection
context laws governing sentencing of probationers and parolees
upon revocation. However, these alternative modes of conditional
liberty have been compared and contrasted both statutorily and
judicially. Under federal law, probation may be granted by a court
as part of the sentencing process upon entering a judgment of con-
viction." The sentencing court sets the conditions of probation,s
determines the period of probation,39 modifies probation during its
continuance,"0 issues a warrant for the probationer's arrest in the
event of an alleged violation," conducts the probation revocation
hearing, 2 and sets the probationer's sentence upon revocation. 43
Parole, on the other hand, is a form of conditional release within the
jurisdiction of the United States Parole Commission, an administra-
tive body." The United States Parole Commission has the power to
grant or to deny parole to any federal prisoner,45 to set the conditions
of parole,"B to modify parole conditions,'4 to conduct parole revoca-
tion hearings, 8 and to request probation officers to perform parole
supervision.' The guiding purpose for the creation of the United
States Parole Commission was the congressional desire to establish
"fair and equitable parole procedures,"" to clarify the procedural
steps in the parole process' and to meet the Supreme Court re-
35. 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
36. The exemptions granted to civil debtors but denied criminal debtors included the
right to a hearing before judgment was entered against them and any exemptions, except
homestead, that a civil debtor would have enjoyed under the Kansas civil procedure code.




41. 18 U.S.C. § 3653 (1976).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See 18 U.S.C. § 4203 (1976).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 4203(b)(1) (1976).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 4203(b)(2) (1976).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 4203(b)(3) (1976).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 4214 (1976).
49. 18 U.S.C. § 4203(b)(4) (1976).




quirements of due process in the revocation of parole for technical
violations of parole conditions.5 2 Under the 1976 law53 creating the
Commission, the parolee is given credit against his sentence for the
time he has spent on parole prior to revocation. No similar provision
for credit against a subsequent sentence exists for probationers.
The Supreme Court has discussed the similarity of parole and
probation in several cases. In both Roberts v. United States,54 a
probation revocation case, and Zerbst v. Kidwell,5 a parole revoca-
tion case, the Court indicated that the primary purpose of both
probation and parole is rehabilitation. In Morrissey v. Brewer,"6 a
procedural due process challenge to a revocation of parole without
a hearing, the Court found that parole was essentially a state of
conditional liberty and reasoned that the revocation of parole was
such a grievous loss of liberty that it invoked many of the procedural
due process protections of the fourteenth amendment. Affirming
this opinion in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, in which a probationer claimed
the same procedural due process rights granted parolees, the Court
held that the guarantee of due process applied equally to the revoca-
tion of parole and probation. Thus the Court has made no constitu-
tional distinctions between probation and parole practices chal-
lenged under the due process clause."
The Supreme Court has never reached the question of equal
protection of probationers and parolees under the equal protection
clause. The Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Young, 51 however,
reviewed an equal protection claim brought by a probationer who
had served nearly his entire sentence on probation when his proba-
tion was revoked and his entire sentence reinstated. Under Minne-
sota law6" a parolee received credit for time on parole while a proba-
tioner served his entire sentence without credit upon revocation.
The court stated that probationers and parolees constituted differ-
ent classes, characterizing probation as a form of judicial grace and
52. 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 335, 339 (1976).
53. 18 U.S.C. § 4210 (1976); 28 C.F.R. § 2.52(c) (1976) (effectuating regulations).
54. 320 U.S. 264, 272 (1943).
55. 304 U.S. 359, 363 (1938). See also Alvarado v. McLaughlin, 486 F.2d 541, 545 (4th
Cir. 1973).
56. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
57. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
58. Id. at 782 n.3.
59. 273 Minn. 240, 141 N.W.2d 15 (1966).
60. MINN. STAT. § 609.14 (3)(2) (1964) provides that upon revocation of probation the
sentence to be imposed is the entire sentence previously imposed (no discretion given to
sentencing judge). Under MINN. STAT. § 243.18 (1972), a parolee is entitled to receive credit
against his sentence for the time he was on parole.
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parole as an investment of discipline in a prisoner who earns the
milder punishment. Furthermore, the court viewed probation as a
risk to society that could be best controlled by holding a defendant
fully responsible for meeting the conditions of probation, mindful
that his full sentence could be imposed. Thus, prior to the instant
decision, Young was the only case in which a court had addressed
the issue of coextensive constitutional protection for probationers
and parolees under the equal protection clause.
III. THE INSTANT OPINION
The instant court applied a rational basis standard to resolve
the issue whether unequal treatment of probationers and parolees
in revocation sentencing violates the equal protection safeguards
inherent in the fifth amendment.' Although substantially accepting
petitioner's contention that rehabilitation is the guiding purpose of
both probation and parole, 2 the court nonetheless rejected this sim-
ilarity in purpose as determinative of the equal protection ques-
tion.6" Citing State v. Young,64 the court reiterated the theory that
denying credit in the probation context serves to maintain a respon-
sible attitude among probationers and protects society from re-
peated injury."5 The court additionally stated that Congress could
legitimately allow federal judges wider discretion in sentencing pro-
bationers than it granted to the United States Parole Commission
for sentencing parolees." Finally, the court emphasized that due
process and equal protection principles do not require total symme-
try within the probation and parole systems and that valid legisla-
tive solutions must be respected if the distinctions drawn have some
basis in practical experience or if some legitimate state interest is
advanced.67 Having concluded that both elements were present in
the instant case, the court held that different treatment of proba-
tioners and parolees in revocation sentencing did not violate equal
protection principles."6
61. 568 F.2d 678, 683 (10th Cir. 1978).
62. Citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
478 (1973), the instant court noted that the Supreme Court has recognized the similar,
rehabilitative purposes of both probation and parole. 568 F.2d at 682.
63. Id. at 683.
64. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
65. 568 F.2d at 683.
66. Ad. at 683-84.





Although recent Supreme Court opinions have suggested that
rational basis scrutiny should no longer be utilized to provide auto-
matic validation of legislative classifications, but rather should re-
quire a more realistic nexus between the statutory objective and the
classification made,69 the instant court adopted a traditionally def-
erential test, which, as applied in this case, constituted no scrutiny
whatsoever. In attempting to supply a rationale for the unequal
treatment of probationers and parolees in revocation sentencing, the
court engaged in hypothetical speculation as to the purposes of the
parole practice70 and employed after-the-fact reasoning to rational-
ize an already existing rule.71 As noted previously, however, the
Burger Court's development of an intermediate equal protection
analysis has been largely unarticulated and the circumstances
under which it will be invoked are unclear. Thus the instant court's
decision to apply the traditionally deferential test is neither surpris-
ing nor indefensible. Nonetheless, conceding a minimum level of
scrutiny to be the arguably appropriate standard of review, the
factors identified by the court to satisfy minimum rationality fail
to withstand logical analysis.
In attempting to justify the unique treatment of probationers,
the instant court asserted that denying credit on revocation main-
tains a responsible attitude among probationers and protects society
from repeated injury.72 The court neglected to explain, however, why
the identical rationale does not apply with equal force to parolees.
Like probationers, parolees are released under strict conditions re-
quiring certain, well-defined conduct. The denial of sentence credit
to parolees would obviously encourage compliance with parole con-
ditions. Moreover, having committed an offense deemed serious
enough to warrant incarceration, parolees arguably represent a
greater danger to society than do probationers. Thus the theory
enunciated in State v. Young73 and relied upon by the instant court
69. See notes 59-60 supra and accompanying text.
70. That Congress expressly intended to give greater discretion to federal judges than
to the Parole Commission cannot be found in the legislative history. The instant court merely
borrowed this argument from State v. Young.
71. The argument that the denial of sentence credit to probationers promotes compli-
ance with probation terms and thus justifies the classification is clearly the product of judicial
hindsight. Moreover, if such were the primary purpose of the rule, it would seemingly be best
served by denying credit in all cases, rather than allowing judicial discretion. More impor-
tantly, however, this rationale provides no basis whatever for distinguishing between proba-
tioners and parolees. See text accompanying notes 72-73 infra.
72. 568 F.2d at 683.
73. See notes 59-60 supra and accompanying text.
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fails to afford even a minimally rational basis for distinguishing
between probationers and parolees.
Similarly, the court's argument that Congress could legiti-
mately allow judges greater discretion in sentencing probationers
than it granted to the Parole Commission in resentencing parolees74
is questionable. Federal judges admittedly possess considerable
experience in discretionary sentencing. On the other hand, unlike
federal judges, who must divide their time among an enormous
range of duties and responsibilities, the Parole Commission's exclu-
sive function is to regulate the parole process. Therefore, at least on
the basis of experience, the Parole Commission would seem better
qualified to evaluate the relative risks and benefits involved in the
decision to revoke. Additionally, the Parole Commission exercises
complete discretion in making the decision whether to grant or deny
parole once a prisoner becomes eligible. The factors that must nec-
essarily be evaluated in this decision-the potential risk to society,
the character of the individual, the probability of subsequent viola-
tion, the potential benefit of release to the individual, and the deter-
rent value of denial-are precisely those that would be crucial in
determining whether an individual violating parole should be given
time credit upon revocation, and that are in fact considered by
federal judges making a similar decision in the probation revocation
context. Thus, assuming Congress did in fact intend such a result,75
the argument that federal judges should be allowed greater discre-
tion must be rejected.
Finally, even if allowing greater discretion to federal judges
than to the Parole Board were justified on the basis of experience
and expertise, this rationale fails to address the problem created by
unequal treatment of probationers and parolees. That probationers
are sentenced by judges does not justify unequal treatment but
simply constitutes an additional element of discrimination. In light
of the acknowledged similarity of purpose between the probation
and parole programs, the existence of separate sentencing bodies
possessing varying discretionary powers represents a disparity in
treatment that must itself be justified under fifth amendment prin-
ciples. The arguments relied upon by the instant court to provide
such justification, even under a minimum scrutiny standard, are
plainly inadequate.
ANDREW W. BYRD
74. 568 F.2d at 683-84.
?5. See note 71 supra.
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Labor Law-Taft-Hartley Section 301-Union
May Be Liable for Sympathy Strike Damages
When It Has Failed To Use Reasonable Care To
Prevent Spread of Wildcat Strike
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Plaintiff,' a coal mine owner and operator, brought suit in fed-
eral district court 2 under section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act 3 for
injunctive relief and damages against an international union and
certain of its district, sub-district, and local subdivisions.4 Plaintiff
alleged that its employees had refused to cross picket lines set up
by stranger pickets- in violation of the existing industry-wide collec-
tive bargaining contract.' Defendant union argued that it could not
be held liable because it had neither called for, authorized, nor
ratified7 the wildcat strikes that caused the work stoppages at plain-
1. Plaintiff was Republic Steel Corporation, which owned And operated the Clyde Mine
in Washington County, Pennsylvania, and the Banning Mine in Westmoreland County,
Pennsylvania.
2. Plaintiff filed suit in federal district court in two districts of Pennsylvania. The two
suits were consolidated on appeal.
3. Section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970), provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization repre-
senting employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or
between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy
or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Section 301(b), 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1970), provides that the labor organization "shall be
bound by the acts of its agents," that it may "be sued as an entity," and that money
judgments "shall be enforceable only against the oiganization as an entity and against its
assets, and shall not be enforceable against any individual member or his assets."
4. Defendant international was the United Mine Workers ofAmerica (UMW); the local,
sub-district, and district defendants were subdivisions of the UMW.
5. The stranger pickets were members of UMW Local 6290 and were employees of the
Buckeye Coal Company at its Nemacolin Mine. The record does not indicate the nature of
the dispute leading to their strike against Buckeye and their subsequent picketing of Republic
Steel's mines.
6. Republic Steel and the union were parties to the National Bituminous Coal Wage
Agreement of 1974, which provided in Article XXIII(c):
Should differences arise between the Mine Workers and the Employer as to the
meaning and application of the provisions of this Agreement, or should differences arise
about matters not specifically mentioned in this Agreement, or should any local trouble
of any kind arise at the mine, an earnest effort shall be made to settle such differences
at the earliest practicable time.
Article XXIII(c) also provided specific grievance procedures for grievance settlement. 570
F.2d 467, 474 n.14 (3d Cir. 1978).
7. However, § 301(e) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(e) (1970), provides:
For the purposes of this section, in determining whether any person is acting as an
"agent" of another person so as to make such other person responsible for his acts, the
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tiff's mines. Defendant further contended that the refusal of plain-
tiff's employees to cross the picket lines was a sympathy strikes and
thus not subject to the arbitration provisions of the collective bar-
gaining contract. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of all defendants except the international union.' On appeal,10
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, held,
affirmed and remanded for trial on the international union's liabil-
ity. An international union that is a party to a collective bargaining
contract providing mandatory grievance arbitration has a duty to
make all reasonable efforts to stop the spread of wildcat strikes that
violate the implicit no-strike agreement, and liability for damages
caused by resulting sympathy strikes may be imposed on the inter-
national. Republic Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 570 F.2d
467 (3d Cir. 1978).
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court has construed the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (the Act)1 as enunciating a national policy that labor
disputes are insulated from direct judicial intervention. 2 In San
question of whether the specific acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently
ratified shall not be controlling.
8. A sympathy strike is a work stoppage by the employees of an employer not involved
in a dispute in support of another group of employees who are striking because of a dispute
with their own employer. The strike directly resulting from the actual dispute is usually called
the "underlying dispute" and the secondary work stoppage is called the "sympathy strike."
When the purpose of the secondary work stoppage is to put indirect pressure on the primary
employer, the activity is a "secondary boycott," which is an unfair labor practice under §
8(b)(4)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1970). See note 59
infra.
9. 428 F. Supp. 637 (W.D. Pa. 1977). The lower court distinguished between the sympa-
thy strike by Republic's employees and the allegedly illegal wildcat strike against the primary
employer, reasoning that "[w]here there is no obligation not to engage in a sympathy strike,
there can be no union liability for failure to exert reasonable efforts to end a sympathy strike"
but that there may exist "some obligation on the international union to prevent the spread
of illegal, wildcat strikes by its members to other employers. . .with whom the international
union has contracted." Id. at 642.
10. The international union appealed the denial of its motion for summary judgment.
Republic appealed the granting of summary judgment in favor of the locals, sub-district, and
district unions.
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-187 (1970). The Norris-LaGuardia Act, § 4,29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970),
for example, states that "[n]o court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out
of any labor dispute" to enjoin work stoppages or union organizing unless fraud or violence
are involved.
12. See Old Dominion Branch 496, National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 L.S.
264 (1974); Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966); Local 100,
United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council
v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 13 the Court held that in
any dispute involving what is arguably a protected concerted activ-
ity'4 or an unfair labor practice under the Act, 15 the National Labor
Relations Board (the Board) has original jurisdiction, preempting
the jurisdiction of both state and federal courts.16 The Board's
"exclusive primary competence"'17 prevails unless the state can as-
sert a compelling need to protect its citizens 8 or the activity is of
only peripheral concern to the national labor policy. 9 The judici-
ary's role is enforcement and review of Board rulings. 0 Section 301
of the Taft-Hartley Act carves out an exception to Board preemp-
tion: once a collective bargaining agreement is in effect, the parties
to it may bring traditional breach of contract actions in federal
district court to enforce its terms.2'
13. 359 U.S. 236 (1959). In Garmon an employer brought suit in state court for an
injunction and damages against union recognitional picketing and also filed charges with the
National Labor Relations Board, which declined to exercise its jurisdiction over the dispute.
The state court found violations of California law and awarded damages. The Supreme Court
vacated, declaring that state and federal court jurisdiction was preempted by the Board.
14. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970), provides that
certain concerted activities are lawful:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through represintatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in
section 158(a)(3) of this title.
15. Section 8 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970), makes it an unfair labor practice for
an employer to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees" in the exercise of their § 7
rights; to interfere with the formation of a labor organization by his employees or to dominate
or support a labor organization to which his employees belong; to discriminate in hiring,
firing, or "any term or condition of employment" so as to encourage or discourage union
membership; to fire or discriminate against an employee for having filed a complaint or
testified in a Board proceedingi or to refuse to bargain in good faith with the collective
bargaining representatives of his employees. Section 8 also enumerates certain union activi-
ties that are unfair labor practices: restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their
§ 7 rights, causing or trying to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee so as
to encourage or discourage union membership, refusing to bargain in good faith with the
employer, engaging in secondary boycotts and "hot cargo" agreements, requiring an employer
to pay for work not actually performed ("feather-bedding"), requiring excessive dues, picket-
ing while a collective bargaining contract is in force or within twelve months of a valid
representation election, and picketing for recognition without filing a petition with the Board
within thirty days of beginning such picketing.
16. 359 U.S. at 244.
17. Id. at 245.
18. Id. at 247.
19. Id. at 243.
20. Section 10(e)-(f), 29 U.S.C. § I60(e)-(f) (1970), provides for enforcement and review.
21. Prior to the passage of § 301, enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement
against a union was difficult because of the union's status as an unincorporated association;
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In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 2 the Supreme Court
construed section 301 as providing a source of substantive law as
well as jurisdiction.2 The Court stated that the federal judiciary was
to develop a body of law, guided by the national labor policy of
promoting industrial peace, to enforce collective bargaining agree-
ments.Y In Lincoln Mills the Court ordered specific performance of
a grievance arbitration provision, reasoning that the agreement to
arbitrate was an enforceable contract, the consideration for which
was the union's no-strike agreement.2s The Court continued to for-
mulate substantive law under section 301 in the Steelworkers
Trilogy,28 ruling that the courts were not to consider the merits of
disputes for which arbitration was sought or of arbitrators' awards
once given.2 Rather, the courts were to determine whether the dis-
pute or arbitration award fell within the terms of the contract and
to grant or deny relief accordingly.
Although the Act protects the right to strike except in narrowly
defined circumstances, 8 the Supreme Court held in Local 174,
Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co. 2 that a strike to force an employer to
rehire an employee discharged for cause violated the parties' collec-
for a discussion of this, see Gregory, The Collective Bargaining Agreement: Its Nature and
Scope, 1949 WAsH. U.L.Q. 3. For the Supreme Court's interpretation of the congressional
intent that collective bargaining agreements be enforced judicially as contracts, see, e.g.,
Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962). For an analysis of the applicability
of standard contract law to collective bargaining agreements, see Summers, Collective Agree-
ments and the Law of Contracts, 78 YAmL .J. 525 (1969).
22. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). The union brought suit in Lincoln Mills to compel the employer
to comply with a grievance arbitration provision in the collective bargaining agreement.
23. The Court had dealt with § 301 prior to Lincoln Mills in Association of Westing-
house Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955), and had con-
cluded that § 301 did not give the courts jurisdiction when unions sought to enforce "uniquely
personal rights" of employees, such as a demand for unpaid wages. Westinghouse was subse-
quently overruled by Smith v. Evening News, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
24. 353 U.S. at 450-52, 456.
25. Id. at 455.
26. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelwork-
era v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
27. In American Mfg. and Warrior Navigation the union sought to enjoin employers to
arbitrate grievances that the employers argued did not merit arbitration; in Enterprise Wheel
the union sought enforcement of an arbitration award.
28. Section 13, National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1970), provides: "Noth-
ing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as
either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the
limitations or qualifications on that right."
29. 369 U.S. 95 (1962). The employer's suit in Lucas was initially filed in state court.
The Supreme Court also ruled that, though state courts have jurisdiction of breach of contract
actions, if a particular state law is in conflict with federal law on this subject, federal law
prevails.
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tive bargaining agreement. The agreement in Lucas lacked an ex-
plicit no-strike clause, but the Court found that the provision for
grievance arbitration created an implied contract not to strike and
awarded damages to the employer."0
Relief against strikes in breach of contract has not been limited
to damage awards. In Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union
Local 770, '31 the Supreme Court ruled that despite the Norris-
LaGuardia prohibitions against enjoining strikes,12 injunctive relief
was proper when a union work stoppage violated an express no-
strike agreement. The Court reasoned that the national policy in
favor of arbitration mandated enjoining such strikes, noting that
employers would agree to grievance arbitration only when the quid
pro quo was a no-strike obligation and that the incentive for such
bargains was diminished if direct enforcement by injunction was not
available.13 In Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers" the Court
found an implied duty not to strike arising from a mandatory arbi-
tration clause and ruled that the federal courts had the power under
section 301 to enjoin violations of an implied no-strike clause. 5
The Supreme Court, however, limited its holding in Boys
Markets, expressly stating that injunctive relief was proper only
when the collective bargaining contract contained a mandatory
grievance arbitration procedure and the strike was "over a grievance
which both parties are contractually bound to arbitrate." 3 The sig-
30. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, declared that "[tihe collective bargain-
ing contract expressly imposed upon both parties the duty of submitting the dispute in
question to final and binding arbitration." Id. at 105.
31. 398 U.S. 235 (1970). This decision overruled Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370
U.S. 195 (1962), in which the Court had held that the Norris-LaGuardia anti-injunction
provisions, see note 11 supra, precluded enjoining a strike even when that strike was a breach
of a collective bargaining contract containing a binding arbitration clause.
The Boys Markets collective bargaining contract contained an express no-strike clause
as well as arbitration provisions, but the defendant union nonetheless struck and picketed
one of the supermarkets owned by the corporation in a dispute over work being assigned to
non-union members.
For a discussion of judicial handling of the injunction issue between Atkinson and Boys
Markets and a criticism of the Boys Markets rationale, see Vladeck, Boys Markets and
National Labor Policy, 24 Vsm. L. Ray. 93 (1970).
32. See note 11 supra.
33. 398 U.S. at 248.
34. 414 U.S. 368 (1974). In Gateway the union called a strike over a safety dispute and
refused the employer's requests that the employees return to work and arbitrate the conflict.
The union and the employer were parties to the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement
of 1968. The Court interpreted the provision in which the parties agreed to arbitrate all local
disputes as including safety disputes and as implying a no-strike clause. Id. at 376.
35. Id. at 381-82.
36. 398 U.S. at 254. The Court further prescribed guidelines for enjoining strikes: the
district court must determine that the contract does indeed require arbitration, that the
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nificance of that limitation became clear with the Court's ruling in
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers 7 that issuance of an in-
junction against a sympathy strike was improper. The sympathy
strikers in Buffalo Forge had agreed in their collective bargaining
contract to a no-strike clause, but subsequently refused to cross a
picket line set up by recognition strikers.8 The Court held that the
strike did not come within the Boys Markets rule because the under-
lying dispute was a legal strike and the sympathy strike "was not
over any dispute between the Union and the employer that was even
remotely subject to the arbitration provisions of the contract.""9
The Buffalo Forge holding appeared to have significantly lim-
ited the applicability of section 301 in the sympathy strike context. 0
The federal courts successively rejected various theories that sought
to show violation of an agreement to arbitrate rather than to strike
in sympathy strike situations. Thus the federal district court rea-
soned in United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers" that
Buffalo Forge shielded sympathy strikers from an injunction be-
cause the dispute between the sympathy strikers and their employer
could not be arbitrated.2 In Consolidation Coal Co. v. United Mine
Workers13 the Fourth Circuit rejected the contention that Buffalo
Forge could be circumvented by looking to the dispute between the
plaintiff employer and the stranger pickets and held that this dis-
pute was not arbitrable. The Third Circuit in United States Steel
Corp. v. United Mine Workers (U.S. Steel I)I" declined to take a
third possible approach-that the relevant arbitrable dispute was
the dispute between the employer and employees engaged in the
underlying strike-and emphasized that the underlying strike could
in no way have been arbitrated between plaintiff and defendant
employer will arbitrate once the strike is enjoined, that breaches of contract have in fact
occurred or are certain to occur, that these breaches are such as to cause irreparable harm to
the employer, and that denial of the injunction will cause greater harm to the employer than
issuance of it will cause to the union.
37. 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
38. Id. at 400-01.
39. Id. at 407 (emphasis by the Court).
40. See, e.g., Lowden & Flaherty, Sympathy Strikes, Arbitration Policy, and the En-
forceability of No-Strike Agreements-An Analysis of Buffalo Forge, 45 GEo. WASH. L. Rv.
633 (1977); 55 N.C.L. Rav. 1247 (1977).
41. 418 F. Supp. 172 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
42. See also Zeigler Coal Co. v. Local 1870, UMW, 566 F.2d 582 (7th Cir. 1977); South-
ern Ohio Coal Co. v. UMW, 551 F.2d 695 (6th Cir. 1977); Latrobe Steel Co. v. United
Steelworkers, 545 F.2d 1336 (3d Cir. 1976).
43. 537 F.2d 1226 (4th Cir. 1976).
44. 548 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1976).
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local to which plaintiff's employees belonged.45 The U.S. Steel I1
court found that Buffalo Forge precluded damages as well as injunc-
tive relief in the absence of an arbitrable dispute.46 The Third Cir-
cuit, however, had held earlier in Eazor Express, Inc. v. Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters47 that unions that were parties to
a contract having a no-strike clause had a duty to use all reasonable
means to bring unauthorized strikes to an end and were liable for
damages caused by their failure to do so.
III. THE INSTANT OPINION
The instant case presented the question left open by U.S. Steel
II: whether an employer may obtain damages against an interna-
tional union when his own employees engaged in a sympathy strike
triggered by wildcat strikes against another employer in violation of
an implied no-strike contract. 8 The court, having noted that the
injunctive issue was now moot,4" rejected the union's contention
that it could not be held liable for damages because it had not called
or ratified the strike." The court also rejected the union's argument
that the decisions in Buffalo Forge and U.S. Steel II immunized
sympathy strikes against injunctions and damages under section
301.51 The court distinguished the instant case from both Buffalo
Forge52 and U.S. Steel It, 5 stating that the two cases precluded relief
under section 301 only when the underlying dispute was not subject
to arbitration between plaintiff and defendant. In contrast, the sym-
pathy strike at Republic Steel's two mines resulted from an underly-
ing strike that was alleged to be illegal because the collective bar-
gaining agreement provided for compulsory arbitration and thus
created an implied obligation not to strike24 Therefore, relief under
45. Id. at 73. The Court also held that the sympathy strike, like the Buffalo Forge strike,
was not arbitrable. Id.
46. Id. at 74.
47. 520 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1975). In Eazor union members struck over the discharge for
cause of two employees. The union itself did not authorize the strike and characterized it as
illegal; however, certain local officers participated in the strikes, and the union itself took no
effective action to prevent the spread of the strike to the premises of a second employer or to
prevent destruction of property, threats, and violence on the part of the strikers.
48. 570 F.2d at 470.
49. Id. at 476.
50. Id. at 476-77.
51. Id. at 477.
52. See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
53. See text accompanying notes 44-45 supra.
54. 570 F.2d at 477. All parties in both the sympathy strike and the underlying strike
were governed by the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1974, which provided
grievance arbitration as "the exclusive and compulsory means for resolving disputes" and
[Vol. 31:706
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section 301 was potentially available to the employer.
Citing the national policy of promoting peaceful settlement of
labor disputes and avoiding the violence resulting from wildcat
strikes in the coal mining industry, the court found that the interna-
tional union had a duty to prevent the spread of wildcat strikes of
the sort that caused the work stoppage at plaintiff's two mines. 5
The court distinguished, however, between the liability of the inter-
national union and that of the subdivisions of the union on the basis
of ability to control both the underlying and sympathy strikers. In
holding that only the international was liable, the court noted that
the international had communication links with both groups
whereas the subdivisions of the union were not shown to have had
simultaneous contact with both the sympathy strikers and the rov-
ing pickets."5 Furthermore, the court reasoned that the interaction
between plaintiff's employees and the roving pickets arose from
their being members of the same international union. Thus the
international had a responsibility to control and discipline its mem-
bers and to insure observance of the terms of the collective bargain-
ing contract. 7 The court held that if on remand plaintiff employer
established that the stranger picketing itself resulted from an en-
joinable strike and that the international union knew or should have
known of the wildcat strike, but failed to exhaust all reasonable
efforts to prevent its spread, the international union could be held
liable for damages. 8
IV. COMMENT
Although the result reached by the instant court may well be
correct, the analysis leading to that result is flawed and further
confuses the sympathy strike issue. The court began by shifting its
focus from the sympathy strike to the underlying dispute and ended
by merging them into a single wrong on which the employer could
bring suit. The only employees, however, who had a contractual
obligation to arbitrate disputes with the plaintiff instead of striking
were his own employees, yet those employees had no dispute that
could be arbitrated. The refusal to cross a picket line sprang not
thus implied a duty not to strike. The court relied on Gateway in finding the implied no.strike
clause.
55. 570 F.2d at 479.
56. Id. at 478.
57. Id. at 479. The court cited Eazor, as establishing the international's duty to insure
fulfillment of the no-strike obligation; however, the no-strike clause in Eazor was express
rather than implied. See note 47 supra.
58. 570 F.2d at 479.
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from an employer-employee conflict but from the desire to demon-
strate support of a separate group of employees or from the fear of
retaliation by the stranger pickets. Arbitration between employer
and sympathy strikers would be a futile exercise. Likewise, the
plaintiff could not assert logically any contractual right as to the
roving pickets; they had no dispute with plaintiff and their contrac-
tual pledge to arbitrate had been made to their own employer.
To allow an employer to sue for breach of contract when the
breach occurred between a second employer and his employees sim-
ply because both employers and their respective employees are par-
ties to a uniform industry-wide collective bargaining contract is to
misconstrue the principles of contract law. A logical extension of the
court's reasoning would be to allow any union local to bring suit
against an employers' association because one employer breached
the grievance arbitration clause by refusing to arbitrate a grievance
with his own employees. The instant court has blurred the basic
contractual relationships in order to find a breach of contract be-
tween plaintiff and defendant. Without such a finding, judicial in-
tervention under section 301 would not be possible, and the Board's
jurisdiction would preempt that of the court.
The desirable result of enforcing the international union's duty
of reasonable care to prevent the spread of wildcat strikes should
have been reached by following the Act's provisions for dealing with
secondary boycotts. Any damages suffered by plaintiff resulted only
indirectly from a breach of contract. The direct cause appears to
have been a secondary boycott, in which employees having a pri-
mary dispute with their own employer picketed a secondary em-
ployer to induce a work stoppage by the latter's employees in order
to bring pressure to bear ultimately upon the primary employer.
Secondary boycotts are an unfair labor practice under the Act.5'
When a secondary boycott charge is filed with the Board, the Act
provides for an expeditious preliminary investigation, and upon a
finding of probable cause, the Board itself will seek injunctive relief
for the secondary employer. 0 Furthermore, section 303 of the Taft-
Hartley Act provides that the injured employer may bring suit in
federal district court against the union for damages resulting from
59. Section 8(b)(4)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1970), provides in part that it shall
be an unfair labor practice "to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person
engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce" to strike when the purpose of
that strike is to force the secondary employer "to cease doing business with" the primary
employer. The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Local 825, Operating Engineers, 400 U.S. 297
(1971), warned against reading the "cease doing business" language too narrowly.
60. Section 10(1), 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1970).
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a secondary boycott." Thus both injunctive relief and damages are
available to an employer when his business is injured by an unfair
labor practice.
Significant advantages are gained by using the unfair labor
practice charge rather than the breach of contract suit. The second-
ary boycott charge assures that the experience and specialized
knowledge of the National Labor Relations Board will be brought
to bear on the conflict and that a uniform approach will be formu-
lated. A Board-procured injunction will exacerbate any existing
conflict to a lesser degree than a federal court injunction obtained
directly by the employer against his own employees. Moreover, a
Board investigation will provide a balanced examination of the facts
relevant to any later suit for damages. Finally, the secondary boy-
cott charge avoids the logical convolutions to which the instant
court resorted in order to reach what it believed to be a proper
assigning of responsibility.
The international union does have a duty to make reasonable
efforts to prevent the spread of unauthorized strikes. Such strikes
disrupt industrial functions and damage employer and public alike,
and the international union is perhaps the sole entity that can cur-
tail wildcat strikes with effectiveness. The international's duty of
reasonable care, however, arises not from contract law but from
statute. Therefore, the proper source of enforcement is the method
prescribed by the National Labor Relations Act-filing of an unfair
labor practice charge, Board action, and finally court enforcement.
The narrow exception provided in section 301 to Board preemption
of jurisdiction over labor disputes should apply only when the con-
tractual relationship between parties is direct and primary. To dis-
tort that relationship as the instant court did is to misapply section
301 and to undercut the secondary boycott sanctions of the Act.
JUDrrH MILLER JANSSEN
61. Section SO3(b), 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1970).
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Uniform Commercial Code-Secured
Transactions-Article Nine Does Not Permit
Unsecured Claims To Achieve Secured and
Perfected Status by a Post-Bankruptcy
Assignment to a Senior Secured Creditor
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
In a bankruptcy proceeding,1 Revlon, the secured creditor of the
bankrupt debtor,2 sought to recover both its claim against the
debtor and the claims of subsidiaries assigned to Revlon after adju-
dication.3 Revlon argued that the claims assigned by its subsidiaries
became secured and perfected under the umbrella of Revlon's omni-
bus security agreement and financing statement.4 An intervening
creditor holding a perfected security interest in the debtor's inven-
tory5 contended that the post-bankruptcy assignments of unsecured
and unperfected claims did not create perfected security interests
in favor of the subsidiaries. The Bankruptcy Judge, concluding that
the debtor's obligations to the subsidiaries were secured and per-
fected under Revlon's security agreement and financing statement, 6
1. On August 23, 1972, E.A. Fretz Co. filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, and
adjudication followed.
2. E.A. Fretz Co., "Debtor," executed a security agreement with Revlon, Inc., "Secured
Party," on April 3, 1971, giving Revlon a security interest in existing and after-acquired
equipment and collateral. The pertinent portions of this security agreement are:
(1) All debts. . owing by Debtor... to REVLON, INC. and/or all of its present
and future divisions and affiliates. . . due or to become due, now existing or hereafter
arising, including without limitation any debt, liability or obligation owing from Debtor
and/or any of its present or future divisions and affiliates to others which REVLON,
INC. and/or its present and future divisions and affiliates may have obtained by assign-
ment or otherwise ....
(2) All existing and future indebtedness and liabilities of any and every kind or nature,
now or hereafter owing by Debtor to Secured Party, howsoever such indebtedness shall
arise or be incurred or evidenced.
3. On September 19, 1972, Revlon-Realistic Professional Products, Inc., and Cosmetic
Capital Corp., both subsidiaries of Revlon, assigned their general claims against the Debtor
to Revlon.
4. A financing statement signed by the Debtor and Secured Party was filed with the
Texas Secretary of State on April 5, 1971. The financing statement described the collateral
and designated Fretz as debtor and Revlon as the only secured party.
5. On June 30, 1971, the Debtor executed a security agreement with Republic National
Bank of Dallas, "Intervening Creditor," giving the bank a security interest in various collat-
eral including the Debtor's inventory, then existing or subsequently acquired, and all the
proceeds therefrom. A financing statement signed by the Debtor and Republic, describing the
collateral, and respectively designating Fretz and Republic as debtor and secured party, was
filed with the Secretary of State on August 11, 1971.
6. The Bankruptcy Judge made the following conclusions of law:
(1) The indebtedness of Fretz to Revlon-Realistic (a subsidiary), which has been as-
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allowed the claims in toto, leaving no proceeds to pay the claim of
the intervening creditor.7 The District Court affirmed the order
without opinion. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, held, reversed and remanded. The Uniform Com-
mercial Code and the Bankruptcy Act do not permit general credi-
tors to achieve perfected secured status by assigning their claims to
a senior lienor after the debtor's bankruptcy. In re E.A. Fretz Co.,
565 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1978).
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
While no court has considered the question whether the Uni-
form Commercial Code permits the use of "floating secured par-
ties,"8 the Code's provisions dealing with "floating" collateral and
debt,' as well as Bankruptcy Act principles, serve as a framework
for analysis. Article Nine clearly contemplates a scheme whereby
either future indebtedness or future acquired property is secured
and perfected under the umbrella of the original security agreement
and financing statement.10 Section 9-204(1) permits a security
agreement to "provide that any or all obligations covered by the
security agreement are to be secured by after-acquired collateral.""
Similarly, section 9-204(3) allows "[o]bligations covered by a secu-
rity agreement . . . [to] include future advances or other value
whether or not the advances or value are given pursuant to commit-
signed by Revlon-Realistic to Revlon, is secured by the security interests of Revlon.
(2) The indebtedness of Fretz to Cosmetic Capital (a subsidiary), which has been
assigned by Cosmetic Capital to Revlon, is secured by the security interests of Revlon.
(3) Such security interests were duly perfected by the filing of the financing statement
(naming Fretz and Revlon on April 5, 1971) ....
7. The proceeds from the sale of the bankrupt debtor's equipment and inventory were
approximately $100,000. Revlon's claim against the proceeds was about $30,000; the claims
of the subsidiaries against the Debtor amounted to over $190,000. Because the Bankruptcy
Judge allowed Revlon's and the subsidiaries' claims in toto, no proceeds were left to pay the
Intervening Creditor.
8. The instant court used the term "floating secured parties" to describe the arrange-
ment that would permit Revlon's security interest to "float" among whichever general credi-
tors should assign their claims to Revlon. The court described floating secured parties as "an
open-ended class of creditors with unsecured and unperfected security interests who, after
the debtor's bankruptcy, can assign their claims to a more senior lienor and. . . secure and
perfect their interests under an omnibus security agreement and financing statement." 565
F.2d at 369. This agreement is analogous to the floating lien that Article Nine creates with
respect to after-acquired property and future advances. See note 9 infra.
9. Commentators find that Article Nine transactions may create a lien that "floats"
from one piece of collateral to another and may secure first one debt and then another. P.
COOGAN, W. HoAN & D. VAGTs, 1 SEcuREr TANSACno SS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCL
CODE §§ 7.01-.11 (rev. ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as COOGN].
10. U.C.C. §§ 9-204, 9-402, 9-312 (all U.C.C. references are to the 1972 version).
11. U.C.C. § 9-204(1).
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ment.' '1 2 The comments following section 9-204 reflect the Code's
acceptance of the "continuing general lien" and its rejection of pre-
Code judicial prejudice against floating collateral and debt. 3 The
pre-Code prejudice against the floating lien was based on the fear
that such a lien would encumber all of the debtor's assets with one
creditor, thus hampering the debtor's ability to get credit from any-
one else." Pre-Code courts also feared that floating liens would de-
prive intervening creditors of the protection of a cushion of free
assets."5 To circumvent this judicial prejudice against floating liens,
a number of pre-Code security devices such as field warehousing,
trust receipts, and factor's liens were designed. The draftsmen of
the Code, by expressly recognizing floating collateral and debt,
sought to protect creditors and debtors by reducing the inconsis-
tency and uncertainty of pre-Code law. 7
Article Nine further facilitates the use of floating collateral and
debt by establishing a "notice-filing" and priority system under
which the secured party can perfect both present and future claims
by filing a single financing statement.'8 The financing statement is
required to include only the names and addresses of the parties and
the type of collateral.' 9 The purpose of the financing statement is
merely to put other creditors on notice of the prior transaction so
that creditors can inquire about the details at their own discre-
tion.21 In National .Cash Register Co. v. Firestone & Co., 2' a Mas-
sachusetts court found that a single financing statement was valid
12. U.C.C. § 9-204(3).
13. "This Article accepts the principle of a 'continuing general lien.' It rejects the
doctrine . . . that there is reason to invalidate as a matter of law what has been variously
called the floating charge, the free-handed mortgage and the lien on a shifting stock." U.C.C.
§ 9-204, Comment 2.
14. Id. See also 1 Coorw, supra note 9, at § 7.0311].
15. U.C.C. § 9-204, Comment 2.
16. Id. "Despite this judicial prejudice against security interests in after-acquired prop-
erty, the need for new sources of collateral led to the development of legal devices that
permitted a collateral-starved debtor to obtain a loan secured not only by property presently
in his possession, but also by property that he would have in the future." Kronman, The
Treatment of Security Interests in After-Acquired Property Under the Proposed Bankruptcy
Act, 124 U. PA. L. Rav. 110, 118 (1975).
17. "The substantive rules of law set forth in the balance of the Article are designed to
achieve the protection of the debtor and the equitable resolution of the conflicting claims of
creditors which the old rules no longer give." U.C.C. § 9-204, Comment 2.
18. U.C.C. §§ 9-402 & 9-312(5).
19. No details are required with regard to the amount or other items of the transaction.
U.C.C. § 9-402.
20. "This section [9-402] adopts the system of 'notice filing' . .. .The notice itself
indicates merely that the secured party who has filed may have a security interest in the
collateral described. Further inquiry from the parties concerned will be necessary to disclose
the complete state of affairs." Id., Comment 2.
21. 346 Mass. 244, 191 N.E.2d 471 (1963).
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to cover after-acquired property even though the financing state-
ment included no reference to the after-acquired property clause
of the security agreement."2 Priority among secured parties who
perfect by filing is determined by the first to file a financing state-
ment.2 Therefore, in Friedlander v. AdeIphi Mfg. Co., 21 the New
York Supreme Court held that the secured party who is first to file
has priority over a subsequently perfected security interest with
regard to both the original advance and future advances, even
though the future advances may have taken place after the inter-
vening party obtained his security interest.
Despite the express sanctioning of floating liens by the Code,
some courts nevertheless have been troubled by the use of "blanket
filings' '2 to perfect later advances and the use of broadly drafted
future advances clauses.26 In Coin-O-Matic Service Co. v. Rhode
Island Hospital Trust Co.,2 the Rhode Island Superior Court re-
fused to hold that later advances dated back to the time of the
original filing when the security agreement had no future advances
provision. 2 The Rhode Island court feared that a creditor could
22. In National Cash Register, the court held that the security interest of Firestone had
priority over the security interest of a subsequent creditor (whose security consisted of a cash
register that it sold to the debtor restaurant) when Firestone (whose security agreement
covered "all contents" (present and future) of the restaurant) had first filed a financing
statement. The court found that the financing statement need not refer to the security
agreement's after-acquired property clause because under the Code's notice filing system the
subsequent creditor had adequate information to ascertain the facts he needed to know for
further inquiry. Id.
23. U.C.C. § 9-312(5).
24. 5 U.C.C. RaP. SEav. 7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968).
25. H. KmPz, R. BRAUCHER, P. CoooAN, G. GILMoRE & R. HAYDOCK, JR., PROBLMS OF
LzmEwS, BoRnowsas mD SELLERS UNDER THE UNwioRo COwMCL CODE 10-17 (1968). The
term "blanket filing" refers to the situation in which a creditor seeks to perfect his claim to
subsequently acquired assets or indebtedness under the "blanket" of the original financing
statement. See note 27 infra.
26. See 34 U. Prrr. L. Ra,. 691 (1973).
27. 3 U.C.C. REP. Sar. 1112 (R.I. Super. Ct. 1966).
28. In Coin-O-Matic, the debtor entered into a security agreement with Rhode Island
Hospital Trust Co. that had no provision for future advances. Rhode Island Hospital Trust
filed a financing statement prior to the time the debtor entered into a security check with
Coin-O-Matic and Coin-O-Matic filed its financing statement. Rhode Island Hospital Trust
subsequently loaned the debtor $1,000 from which sum the debtor satisfied his original obliga-
tion to Rhode Island Hospital Trust. Upon the debtor's bankruptcy, Rhode Island Hospital
Trust claimed it was entitled to a priority with regard to its $1,000 loan based upon its origi-
nal financing statement. The court ruled against Rhode Island Hospital Trust, holding that
a single financing statement in connection with a security agreement in which no provision
is made for future advances is not an umbrella for later advances. Id. at 1120.
Other courts have refused to follow the Coin-.-Matic doctrine and have held that prior-
ity on later advances dates from the first filing even though the original agreement contem-
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unduly restrict a debtor's power to borrow if the creditor's rights to
all advances dated from the original filing."9 Furthermore, the Coin-
O-Matic court was reluctant to give priority for later advances from
the time of the first filing when the security agreement contem-
plated a one-shot deal instead of a series of advances."
Similarly, courts have been wary of future advances provisions
purporting to include all obligations of any type that a debtor may
thereafter owe to his secured creditor.31 These broad future advances
provisions are known as "dragnet clauses" or Anaconda mortgages
because by their broad general terms, they enwrap the unsuspecting
debtor in the folds of indebtedness that he did not contemplate
securing by the original agreement. 32 Despite Article Nine's appar-
ently unrestricted sanctioning of future advances arrangements,
some courts have limited the use of dragnet clauses. In John Miller
Supply Co. v. Western State Bank,3' the Supreme Court of Wiscon-
sin refused to enforce a broadly drafted future advances clause be-
cause the subsequent advances were so unrelated to the earlier loan
transaction as to negate the inference that the debtor consented to
its inclusion in the security agreement.35 In addition to employing
the "same class" test applied in John Miller Supply Co., courts have
struck down dragnet clauses because the subsequent indebtedness
was not reasonably within the contemplation of the parties.3'
plated only one loan. In re Rivet, 299 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Mich. 1969); Household Fin. Corp.
v. Bank Comm'r, 248 Md. 233, 235 A.2d 732 (1967).
29. 3 U.C.C. REP. SEnv. at 1120.
80. For a discussion of the Coin-O-Matic case, see J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, THE UNI-
FORM CoMMERciA ConE § 25-4 at 907-08 (1972).
31. The problem arises "when a lender, relying on a broadly drafted clause, seeks to
bring within the shelter of his security arrangement claims against the debtor which are
unrelated to the course of financing that was contemplated by the parties." 2 G. Gumsonn,
SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 35.5 at 932 (1965).
32. See note 26 supra at 692.
33. See notes 35 & 36 infra.
34. 55 Wis. 2d 385, 199 N.W.2d 161 (1972).
35. In John Miller Supply Co., the original security agreement granted the creditor a
security interest in certain of the debtor's property as collateral "to secure payment of such
loans and all other obligations." Obligations were defined as "all Debtor's present and future
debts, obligations and liabilities [to the Creditor] of whatever nature." Id. at 163. The
creditor sought to recoverthe collateral in satisfaction of $5,000 loaned to the debtor pursuant
to the security agreement and for $30,000 in damages for delivery of defective products pur-
suant to a subsequent marketing contract with the debtor. Id.
The court found "no evidence that the parties contemplated [that] the security interest
would cover future breaches of sales contracts not directly related to the lending of money."
Id. at 164. The court, applying the "same class" test, held that the obligation arising out of
the marketing contract was not of the same nature or related to the types of indebtedness in
the original financing agreement. Id.
36. In In re Sanelco, 7 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 65 (M.D. Fla. 1969), and Capocasa v. First
Nat'l Bank, 36 Wis. 2d 714, 154 N.W.2d 271 (1967), the courts held that future advances
RECENT CASES
The concept of the floating lien is difficult to reconcile with the
preference provisions of the Bankruptcy ActY Section 60(a)(1) of
the Bankruptcy Act defines a preference as:
a transfer, .. of any of the property of a debtor to or for the benefit of a
creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt, made or suffered by such
debtor while insolvent and within four months before the filing by or against
[the debtor] of the [Bankruptcy] petition . . . the effect of which transfer
will be to enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than
some other creditor of the same class.u
The purpose of section 60 is to prevent the exhaustion of the debtor's
assets by a coerced or voluntary transfer of his assets to certain
creditors immediately before the date of bankruptcy.31 Thus, the
Act necessarily invalidates certain transactions that have occurred
prior to bankruptcy." The crucial question with regard to the float-
ing lien is whether property obtained or indebtedrless incurred by
the insolvent debtor pursuant to an after-acquired property or fu-
ture advances clause within four months of bankruptcy constitutes
a voidable preference under section 60.1 In Grain Merchants of
Indiana, Inc. v. Union Bank and Savings Co. 42 and Rosenberg v.
Rudnick,"3 the courts recognized that a literal interpretation of the
"transfer" language of section 60 might give the trustee power to
void a transaction pursuant to a floating arrangement even absent
a true economic preference that section 60 was designed to prevent.
These cases reflect the courts' struggle to preserve the intent of
section 60 to void secret liens and economic preferences, while pre-
serving Article Nine floating liens that do not suffer from these ills."
arrangements are enforced only to the extent that the future transactions of liabilities sought
to be secured are in the clear contemplation of the parties.
37. See R. HENSON, SEcuRE TRANsAcrnoNs 156-84 (1973). The conflict between the
floating lien and the Bankruptcy Act is manifested in section 60 preference attacks against
Article Nine security interests involving after-acquired property and future advances.
38. Bankruptcy Act § 60(a)(1), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1) (1976). Under Bankruptcy Act §
60(b), 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1976), a trustee may avoid the transfer upon showing the creditor
had reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer.
39. W. COLUIER, 3 COLUR ON BANuRurcv § 60.01 at 744 (rev. ed. 1977) [hereinafter
cited as Cou n. Collier notes that if creditors and debtors could deal with impunity with
the debtor's assets up to the date of bankruptcy, only tag ends and remnants of unencum-
bered assets would remain.
40. Id. at 745.
41. The Code attempts to obviate this difficulty and protect the floating lien from a
preference challenge in U.C.C. § 9-108. Section 9-108 provides that a security interest in after-
acquired property that the debtor acquires in the ordinary course of business shall be deemed
to have been taken for new value rather than for antecedent debt, provided new value was
given originally. See also Maio, Secured Transactions: The Code in Bankruptcy Courts, 85
BANKING L.J. 19 (1968).
42. 408 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1969).
43. 262 F. Supp. 635 (D. Mass. 1967).
44. See 1A COOGAN, supra note 9, at § 9A.02[8].
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In Rosenberg, Judge Ford held that the time of the transfer for
bankruptcy purposes was the time the security agreement was exe-
cuted rather than the time at which each distinct item of inventory
was acquired. 5 Thus, even though the secured creditor's lien on the
after-acquired collateral was not perfected according to the Code
until within four months of bankruptcy, the court nevertheless held
that the transfer was not preferential.46 Judge Ford noted that the
lien should be conceived of as a "floating mass," the components of
which may be constantly changing without affecting the res.7 He
further recognized that the mere substitution of collateral did not
involve the evils to which section 60 is directed because there was
no secret lien nor race against other creditors."
In the instant case, the court faced the question whether the
Code sanctions an arrangement under which an unsecured party
seeks to secure and perfect his claim against the debtor pursuant to
an assignment provision in a perfected secured party's umbrella
security agreement. No court had considered the permissibility of
floating secured parties, and such arrangements are not specifically
addressed by the Code. The Code's concept of floating liens, how-
ever, and the principles of the Bankruptcy Act provide the guide-
lines with which to analyze this question.
III. THE INSTANT OPINION
Although recognizing that the Uniform Commercial Code sanc-
tions floating collateral and debt, the instant court refused to recog-
nize floating secured parties. The court rested its decision on three
grounds. First, the court found that the subsidiaries were not se-
cured parties because the security agreement created a security in-
45. Rosenberg involved an action by a trustee in bankruptcy to set aside an alleged
preferential transfer. The District Court held that for the purpose of determining the date of
the alleged preferential transfer of inventory acquired during the four months preceding
bankruptcy, the transfer dated back to the date of the security agreement. 262 F. Supp. at
637.
46. Id. at 639. Judge Ford also noted that the intent of § 9-108 of the Code is that such
a transfer not be considered preferential. See note 41 supra.
47. Judge Ford found that in applying section 60, inventory subjected to a security
interest should be as a single entity and not as a mere conglomeration of individual items
each subject to a separate lien. The security interest is in the entity as a whole and the
transfer of property occurs when this interest in inventory as an entity is created. 262 F. Supp.
at 639.
48. The purpose of section 60 is to protect creditors seeking unfair advantages during
the four months preceding bankruptcy. The creditor here merely was trying to enforce a
security agreement made prior to the four month preference period. The substitution of
collateral during the four months prior to bankruptcy is not preferential when the collateral
replaces the collateral covered by the original security agreement. Id. See 408 F.2d at 217.
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terest only in the senior creditor. 49 Since the subsidiaries had no
security interest, they were not secured parties whose interests could
validly be perfe.cted.
Second, the court reasoned that even assuming the subsidiaries
were secured parties, their interests were not perfected by Revlon's
financing statement because the subsidiaries were neither signato-
ries nor named parties in the financing statement. 0 The court re-
quired strict compliance with the "simple" perfection standards of
Article Nine5 ' since the Code was designed to provide a simple and
unified structure within which the immense variety of secured fi-
nancing transactions could proceed with certainty. Noting that the
use 'of floating secured parties would undercut Article Nine's perfec-
tion requirements, which reflect a Code policy against secret secu-
rity, the court rejected the argument that the intervening creditor
was obliged to ascertain the exact state of affairs through further
inquiry.
Finally the court noted that priority in bankruptcy is deter-
mined as of the date of adjudication.12 Since the subsidiaries' assign-
ments of their claims came after the date of adjudication, the sub-
sidiaries could only recover as unsecured creditors. 53 Recognizing the
enormous potential for collusion or fraud, the court reasoned that
such post-bankruptcy assignments would frustrate the purpose of
the Bankruptcy Act to prevent the exhaustion of the insolvent
debtor's assets.5 Thus, the court concluded that the Code and the
Bankruptcy Act do not permit general creditors through post-
bankruptcy assignments to secure and perfect their claims under
the umbrella of a secured party's omnibus agreement.
49. According to Tax. Bus. & COM. CoDE ANN. tit. 1, § 9.105(a)(9)(Vernon 1968) (corre-
sponding to U.C.C. § 9-105), a secured party is "a lender, seller or other person in whose favor
there is a security interest. . ." (Emphasis added.) The court found the security agreement
created a security interest in Revlon only, and therefore the subsidiaries were not secured
parties.
50. Tax. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 9.402 (Vernon 1968) (corresponding to U.C.C.
§ 9-402) provides:
(a) A financing statement is sufficient if it is signed by the debtor and the secured
party, gives an address of the secured party from which information concerning the
security interest may be obtained, gives a mailing address of the debtor and contains a
statement indicating the types, or describing the items, of collateral ....
The 1974 amendment to § 9.402 eliminated the secured party signature requirement. Taking
its place is the requirement that the secured party's name be set forth on the financing
statement. TEx. Bus. & CoM. Con ANN. tit. 1, § 9.402 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
51. See notes 19, 20, & 50 supra.
52. See 3A Coum, supra note 39, at 64.02(7).
53. 565 F.2d 366, 374 (5th Cir. 1978).




The instant court's refusal to sanction floating secured parties
demonstrates the unwillingness of courts to expand permissible
floating arrangements beyond those clearly allowed by the Code.
This case further illustrates the struggle that courts face when con-
fronted with the competing principles of floating arrangements, the
notice requirements of the Code, and the Bankruptcy Act. The most
persuasive argument advanced by the instant court in rejecting the
use of post-bankruptcy assignments to create senior secured and
perfected interests is the enormous potential for collusion and fraud
that such assignments would create. If a subsidiary or even a com-
plete stranger could secure and perfect a general claim against a
bankrupt by means of a post-bankruptcy assignment, the Bank-
ruptcy Act's purpose to distribute equitably the bankrupt's assets
to creditors would be disrupted." By assigning their claims to a
senior secured party, general creditors could achieve priority for
their claims, thereby exhausting the bankrupt's assets and depriv-
ing junior secured parties of their collateral.
The assignment of general claims to a senior secured party
closely resembles a preferential transfer of the type section 60 of the
Bankruptcy Act is designed to prevent." Unlike section 60 claims
with regard to floating collateral and debt that involve primarily a
substitution of assets, the transfer accomplished by assignment in
this case constitutes a true economic preference." By assigning an
unsecured claim to a senior secured creditor, a general creditor
could obtain a greater percentage of his debt than other creditors
of the same class, a result clearly condemned by section 60.
The instant court correctly noted that Article Nine represents
a comprehensive scheme replacing pre-Code law. By requiring strict
compliance with the perfection requirements of Article Nine, the
court shows a proper reluctance to expand the Code to cover floating
arrangements not contemplated by its drafters. Although Article
55. The Bankruptcy Act deems certain transactions occurring prior to bankruptcy in-
valid in order to avoid exhaustion of the bankrupt's assets. See notes 39 & 40 supra and
accompanying text. The purpose of section 60 also is contradicted by permitting post-
bankruptcy transactions, whereby general creditors can improve their positions by assigning
claims to a senior secured party. Such assignments would allow these general creditors to
obtain a greater percentage of their claims than other general creditors and junior secured
parties.
56. See notes 38-40 supra and accompanying text.
57. See note 48 supra. Post-bankruptcy assignments that allow general creditors to
obtain priority for their claims involve the secret lien and race-among-creditors notion that
section 60 is designed to prevent.
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Nine expressly provides for floating collateral and debt, no Code
provision permits securing and perfecting a general claim by assign-
ment. If a general creditor can obtain secured and perfected status
by assignment under an omnibus security agreement, such an ar-
rangement first should be explicitly sanctioned by the Code and the
legislature, not by a court.
Although the instant court arrives at the correct conclusion, its
analysis of the notice function of Article Nine" is suspect. The court
places strong emphasis on the argument that an intervening creditor
should not have to suffer the increased burden of uncertainty that
floating secured parties impose in addition to the uncertainty pro-
vided by floating collateral and debt.59 The instant court was trou-
bled by the "unrelatedness" of the assignments to the normal lend-
ing and borrowing transactions covered by security agreements. 0
The court apparently reasoned that an assignment, unlike a later
advance, was so unrelated to the ordinary course of borrowing and
lending transactions that the intervening creditor has less reason to
be suspicious. In practice, however, an intervening creditor's igno-
rance of the possibility of a future assignment is hardly distinguish-
able from the possibility that a future advance will be made. In
either case, the Code's minimal notice requirements apparently are
satisfied because intervening creditors are on notice of the prior
transaction. In either case, the intervening creditor's secured inter-
est may be threatened in the future by the increased interest of a
senior lienor.
By rejecting the use of floating secured parties, the court has
appropriately considered the collusive and inequitable results that
such a scheme might entail. Because omnibus arrangements con-
taining assignments similar to those in the instant case probably are
common business practice, the draftsmen of the Code should explic-
itly comment on the use of such provisions. Should the draftsmen
of the Code decide to sanction floating secured parties, conflicts
with Bankruptcy Act principles should be considered. Perhaps the
collusive and fraudulent possibilities of permitting such assign-
ments could be prevented by stipulating a time limit prior to bank-
ruptcy before which such assignments must be made. Furthermore,
58. See notes 19 & 20 supra and accompanying text.
59. The instant court's concern for the predicament of the intervening creditor is similar
to the discomfort that the Coin-O-Matic court had with the notice aspects of floating liens.
In Coin-O-Matic, the court reflected a concern for the intervening creditor who is unable to
discern the nature of the debtor's prior obligations because of the Code's minimal require.
ments for notice. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
60. See notes 31 & 35 supra and accompanying text.
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requiring the secured party to provide notice of such an arrange-
ment in the financing statement would alleviate the potentially




61. See note 59 supra.
